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ABSTRACT
An experiment was conducted to determine whether tests used to assess
working memory in different disciplines (neuroimaging, psycholinguistics,
neuropsychology) are highly correlated, and thus whether they are equivalent
measures of a unitary underlying function. Scores on the different tests (N-back,
reading span, backward digit span) did not correlate highly, and were predicted
by measures of different hypothesized components of working memory. These
results indicate that working memory is best conceived of as a system of
multiple, interacting components that contribute to different aspects of task
performance, rather than as a single, unified resource, and that currently popular
tests of working memory cannot be used interchangeably to measure working
memory.
A second experiment was conducted to examine the relation between sentence
memory and working memory, and to determine whether memory for sentences
is a function of the number of clauses in the sentence, or the number of new
discourse referents. Subjects heard sentences of different lengths (2 - 5
clauses) and structures (relative clause, sentential complement, double object).
Double object sentences contained one additional discourse referent per clause
than the other two sentence types. If new discourse referents are the units of
sentence memory, performance should be worse on double object sentences. If
clauses are the unit of sentence memory, accuracy should be the same for all
three sentence types. There were no reliable differences between double object
sentences and the other two sentences types, indicating the clauses are the units
of sentence memory. Subjects recalled 2-clause sentences highly accurately,
and recalled 4-clause and 5-clause sentences poorly. There were large
individual differences in the recall of 3-clause sentences. Over half of this
variance was accounted for by individual differences in working memory.
Measures of two hypothesized working memory components, the central
executive and the short-term store, each accounted for independent variance in
the sentence memory score.
Thesis Supervisors: Suzanne Corkin, Professor of Behavioral Neuroscience
Mary C. Potter, Professor of Psychology
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Chapter 1
Introduction:
Dissecting Working Memory
Memory is not unitary but depends on the operation of potentially
independent, but typically interactive, components. One of the
jobs of a cognitive neuropsychologist is to identify these component
and indicate how they interact with each other.
- Morris Moscovitch (1992)
10
Introduction
This thesis presents a contribution to ongoing efforts to identify and
explain the components of one mnemonic function, working memory. In order to
understand a complex function like working memory, it is imperative to
incorporate converging evidence from a variety of domains: experimental
psychological studies of normal subjects, neuropsychological investigations of
brain-lesioned subjects, functional neuroimaging studies of brain activity, and
studies of neuronal activity and selective lesions in monkeys. Such an
interdisciplinary approach has two fundamental requirements: First, that the
function under study be clearly defined, and modeled in a way that makes
testable predictions; and second, that there is a clear understanding of the
relation between the function itself and the tasks used to assess the function.
Working memory is an important topic of study, because the ability to
store and manipulate information is central to high-level cognitive functions, such
as reasoning, planning, problem solving, and understanding language. The
working memory construct has been invoked by researchers in a variety of
domains: animal neurophysiology, developmental psychology, cognitive
psychology, psycholinguistics, neuropsychology, and cognitive neuroscience.
This centrality, however, also renders working memory a difficult subject to study,
for two reasons: First, researchers studying non-primate animals (i.e., rats,
pigeons; (Olton, Becker, & Handelmann, 1979), monkeys (Goldman-Rakic &
Friedman, 1991), and humans (Baddeley, 1983) define the function differently.
Second, researchers studying humans, who use Baddeley's (1983) definition of
working memory as the ability to store and manipulate information needed for
complex cognitive tasks, use different tests to assess it. These factors have
made it difficult to compare results across studies, both within and across
disciplines, and to draw conclusions about the cognitive components and neural
substrate of working memory in humans.
The introduction of the concept of working memory has led to progress
within the fields of cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics. An important goal
of cognitive neuroscience, however, is to integrate information about the neural
substrate of a behavior, obtained from neurophysiological, neuropsychological,
and neuroimaging studies, into cognitive models of the behavior. The fact that
researchers using different experimental techniques and subject populations
often use different tasks to assess working memory capacity has proven to be a
hurdle facing those who attempt to develop models of the cognitive and neural
bases of working memory. Even within a discipline, where similar tasks are
used, there are multiple versions of each task, and many parameters that vary
across experiments and laboratories. It is rare to see discussions of how such
differences in materials and procedures may affect results and conclusions. The
experiment in Chapter 2 highlights the problem with using different tasks to
assess working memory: The results showed that scores on tests used in
different disciplines are not correlated with each other, and are predicted by
scores on measures of different hypothesized components of working memory.
This observation suggests that it is not possible to compare results across
experiments, without taking into account the factors to which each test is
sensitive.
Another area in which the introduction of the working memory construct
has proved useful is in the study of the role of working memory in understanding
language. It has been observed that lesions of left posterior parietal cortex result
in a severely reduced short-term storage capacity (a digit or word span of 1 to 3
items). Span-impaired patients, however, have a relatively intact ability to
understand language. This discovery challenged the commonly held assumption
that the verbal short-term storage buffer is required for language processing
(Caplan & Waters, 1990; Caplan & Waters, 1995; Howard & Butterworth, 1989;
Martin, 1987; Martin & Romani, 1994; McCarthy & Warrington, 1987a; McCarthy
& Warrington, 1987b; Saffran & Marin, 1975). The concept of working memory,
with its emphasis on the simultaneous storage and manipulation of information,
has offered a new approach to the study of the relation between language
processing and memory. The experiments in Chapter 3 investigated the role of
working memory in memory for sentences.
I. Animal Studies
A. Rats
In the literature on animal learning, "working memory" is used to refer to
the ability to retain information across trials within a test session (Olton et al.,
1979; Olton & Feustle, 1981). Working memory is distinguished from reference
memory, the animal's between-session memory for the test apparatus and the
task demands. The classic test of working memory uses the radial arm maze, an
apparatus with a several arms radiating from a central starting point. In radial
arm maze tasks, the ends of the arms are baited. The rat is placed at the center,
and allowed to retrieve the food. Working memory is defined as the rat's ability
to remember which arms it has visited (evidenced by avoidance of arms from
which it has already retrieved the food). Working memory in rats is impaired
following lesions of the hippocampal formation (Olton & Feustle, 1981; Olton,
Wenk, Church, & Meck, 1988). This notion of working memory differs from the
usage in human studies, where working memory refers to the on-line storage and
manipulation of information (Baddeley, 1983). The working memory/reference
memory distinction in studies of animal learning is analogous to the
episodic/semantic memory distinction (memory for specific people and events vs.
memory for general information) in studies of human long-term memory (Tulving,
1972).
B. Monkeys
In most monkey studies, working memory refers to the ability to hold
information on-line across a brief delay (Goldman-Rakic & Friedman, 1991),
analogous to short-term memory or short-term storage in human studies
(Baddeley, 1983). Interest in the role of prefrontal cortex in working memory
arose from observations that monkeys with lesions in the region of the principal
sulcus (area 46) performed poorly on tests requiring the maintenance of
information across brief delays (Passingham, 1993). For example, in the delayed
response (DR) task, a monkey watches while one of two food wells is baited, and
both are covered with opaque lids. Then, a screen is lowered, blocking the
monkey's view of the food wells. Following a delay, the screen is raised and the
monkey is allowed to retrieve the food from the baited location. Lesions to the
principal sulcus region of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (area 46) in monkeys
produce severe impairments on this task.
Funahashi et al. (Funahashi, Bruce, & Goldman-Rakic, 1989) recorded
from neurons in the principal sulcus while monkeys performed an oculomotor DR
task with eight possible target locations. They observed neurons that exhibited
delay-period activity. Many of these neurons were directionally-specific: They
responded best when the movement was in one direction, and weakly when the
movement was in other directions. These results suggest that prefrontal neurons
maintain information about the target location across a delay (1-6 sec) in the
absence of direct stimulation or movements. In complementary studies,
Funahashi et al. (Funahashi, Bruce, & Goldman-Rakic, 1993) made selective
lesions to the principal sulcus, and observed performance on the oculomotor DR
task. They found that unilateral lesions led to a delay-dependent impairment in
performance in the contralateral hemifield, with progressive worsening across the
8-sec delay. Wilson et al., (Wilson, O Scalaidhe, & Goldman-Rakic, 1993)
presented evidence for a distinction between spatial and object working memory,
with the former subserved by dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and the latter by
more ventral regions, mirroring the "what-where" division that has been observed
throughout primate visual cortex (Mishkin, Ungerleider, & Macko, 1983).
Petrides has also addressed the question of whether specific regions of
prefrontal cortex perform specialized functions. In selective lesion studies in
monkeys, lesions to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex resulted in impaired
performance on non-spatial working memory tasks, a result that conflicts with the
view that this area is specialized for spatial working memory (Goldman-Rakic &
Friedman, 1991; Wilson et al., 1993). Lesions to the dorsolateral regions (areas
46 and 9) led to impairments on self- and externally-ordered monitoring tasks
(monkeys had to select a single item from among three choices, then on the next
two trials select different items without returning to previously selected items).
These functions were spared following lesions to posterior dorsolateral cortex
(areas 8 and 6). Lesions to this posterior region cause deficits on tasks of
conditional associative learning (Petrides, 1991; Petrides, 1995). Further, lesions
of ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (areas 45 and 47/12) impaired performance on
spatial and nonspatial DR (Petrides, 1994). These results indicate that prefrontal
cortex is not a homogenous region with respect to mnemonic processing, but
instead that different regions contribute to different functions. Dissociations do
not reflect a simple spatial vs. object dichotomy, however, but instead depend on
the type of computations that must be performed on the contents of storage
(Petrides, 1995).
Miller and colleagues have focused on the different executive functions
performed by prefrontal cortex, rather than on functional differences among
areas of prefrontal cortex (Miller, in press). They have studied three executive
functions: selection of task-relevant information; integration of information from
different processing streams (i.e., visual object and visual spatial information);
and rule-learning. Recordings from neurons in the inferior convexity, ventral to
the principal sulcus, revealed activity related to all three functions. For example,
in one experiment monkeys were shown an array of objects, one of which was
cued for later recall, and had to respond (after a 1.5 sec delay) if the object
appeared in the same location as it had appeared before. Neurons showed task-
specific responses: They were selectively active for specific objects, locations, or
combinations of object and location. These neurons were hypothesized to
mediate the selection of task-relevant objects, necessary for focal attention and
response to the target. In another task where both object identity and spatial
location had to be remembered, in turn, some neurons were selective for a
specific object, when identity was relevant, and for a specific location, when
location was relevant (Rao, Rainer, & Miller, 1997). Such neurons seem to have
access to the information needed to integrate "what" and "where" information,
and thus to form a coherent representation of an object's identity and its location
in space.
Thus, while Petrides' studies of selective lesions in primates has focused
on how different prefrontal areas perform different functions, Miller and
colleague's work using neuronal recordings shows that neurons in the same area
reflect (or can be trained to reflect) different task-relevant executive functions.
Resolving the question of whether different areas perform different functions, or
whether the same areas perform multiple functions depending on training and
task demands, will require the convergence of data from selective lesion and
recording studies.
Studies of working memory and executive function in monkeys have
provided important clues to the functional organization of prefrontal cortex.
However, the direct relevance of these studies to human working memory
remains to be established. Several questions remain: First, while neurons in
monkey prefrontal cortex appear to play a role in stimulus maintenance (i.e., DR)
(Funahashi et al., 1989; Funahashi et al., 1993; Miller, Erickson, & Desimone,
1996; Passingham, 1993), humans with extensive lesions to the frontal cortex
are not impaired on simple maintenance tasks (Milner & Petrides, 1984; Petrides
& Milner, 1982). Second, monkeys are extensively trained, over months, on
these tasks, using small sets of stimuli that are repeated and thus become
familiar. It is not clear to what extent this extensive training may be tuning the
neuronal activity, leading to the observed task-relevant responses. Human
subjects, by contrast, can perform more complex tasks after only a brief verbal
explanation, and can generalize to novel stimuli (i.e., spatial locations, objects,
words). It has yet to be determined whether neuronal responses observed in
monkeys after training (i.e. Miller, in press) have a direct analog in humans
performing working memory tests.
II. Human Studies
A. Cognitive Psychology
Within cognitive psychology, the concept of working memory was
introduced as an update to the idea of a passive short-term storage capacity,
such as Miller's classic description of the magical number 7 +/- 2 as the capacity
limit of immediate memory (Miller, 1956). The working memory theory was
intended to include the idea of manipulations or computations being performed
on the contents of storage, and thus to describe a more ecologically valid
construct: the capacity-limited workspace used for sentence comprehension,
reasoning, and problem solving (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974).
There are two main classes of working memory models; they differ in both
the description of working memory, and in the tests used to assess its capacity.
Multicomponent (MC) models hold that working memory consists of a set of
interacting subsystems each dedicated to different components of the overall
function. While there are some differences between specific MC theories, in
general, these theories agree that there are subsystems dedicated to the storage
of different types of information, and a central executive (CE) that is used to
manipulate stored information and to coordinate the activity of the various
subsystems (Baddeley, 1983; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley & Hitch, 1994;
Smith & Jonides, 1997). By contrast, single resource (SR) models hold that
working memory is best conceived as a pool of processing resources that can be
flexibly deployed in the service of a wide variety of cognitive tasks. Processing
resources are used for storage and for performing computations. For difficult
tasks, a large amount of the available resources are required for processing, and
thus fewer resources are available for storage. Individuals may differ in resource
capacity, processing efficiency, or both (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Just &
Carpenter, 1992; Just, Carpenter, & Keller, 1996a). One purpose of this thesis is
to evaluate these models of the architecture of working memory.
Multicomponent (MC) Models
The original MC model was proposed by Baddeley and colleagues
(Baddeley, 1996; Baddeley, 1983; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). In Baddeley's model,
working memory is made up of two subsystems dedicated to the storage of
verbal and visuospatial information, and a CE that coordinates the activity of the
subsystems, and controls attention allocation, goal monitoring, and inhibitory
functions. The least-elaborated component of the model is the CE; evidence
exists that it is made up of dissociable functions (Baddeley, 1996; Lehto, 1996).
Baddeley (1996) has provided preliminary evidence for at least three separate
functions of the CE: the ability to carry out two tasks simultaneously; to override
automatic responses and switch retrieval plans; and to attend selectively. The
verbal subsystem (the phonological loop) consists of two parts: the phonological
input store, (accessed by subvocal speech or directly through auditory input),
which holds information for about 2 sec; and the articulatory rehearsal process,
which actively refreshes the contents of storage.
The original MC model has been fruitful in generating research in several
different disciplines, including cognitive psychology, neuropsychology, and
neuroimaging. It has been extended by other researchers, who have provided
evidence for multiple visual stores and a multi-component central executive, and
have discussed the interaction between working memory and long-term memory
(Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Lehto, 1996; Logie, 1996; Smith & Jonides, 1997). A
model that defines the components working memory, what functions they
perform, and how they interact leads to an improved understanding of the
relation between the brain and behavior: It makes the explicit, testable prediction
that different brain lesions should lead to impairments on different components of
working memory. Patients with such dissociations have been found and studied,
the results are discussed in the next section.
Gathercole & Baddeley (1993) have hypothesized that the phonological
loop and the CE make dissociable contributions to language comprehension. In
their theory, the phonological loop is used to maintain a phonological record of
sentences just heard or read, a record that acts as a backup to the normal on-
line comprehension process (Baddeley & Hitch, 1994). Such a record would be
particularly useful for understanding sentences that are initially understood
incorrectly and must be reanalyzed (i.e., The cotton clothing is made of is grown
in Mississippi), or that contain a long list of items to be remembered (i.e., Please
go to the store and buy bread, milk, eggs, cheese, oranges, and spinach). The
phonological loop is not assumed to be necessary for normal, first-pass sentence
processing, due to the fact that patients with impaired short-term storage
functions retain their ability understand a wide variety of sentence types, and
show comprehension deficits only on long or syntactically complex sentences
(Caplan & Waters, 1990).
According to Gathercole and Baddeley (1993), syntactic and semantic
processing are functions of the CE; no real evidence has been presented to
support this assertion, however. The fact that patients with frontal-lobe lesions
who have functional impairments in executive functions do not typically have
syntactic processing deficits argues against the idea that the CE is the site of
syntactic processing, although such findings do not rule out the possibility that
syntactic processing is carried out by one part of a multicomponent CE. Caplan
& Waters (in press) offer a proposal that directly addresses the role of working
memory in language comprehension. Rather than hypothesizing that first-pass
language processing relies on the CE, they propose that there is an additional
subsystem within working memory that is specialized for the interpretation of
language, which they call the separate language interpretation resource (SLIR).
They introduce an important distinction between two types of processing:
interpretive processing, the assignment of syntactic and semantic structure to
sentences; and post-interpretive processing, the use of interpreted sentences for
other verbal tasks, such as answering questions, reasoning, and planning
actions. This distinction formalizes, within the domain of language processing,
the distinction suggested by Ericsson & Kintsch (1995):
It is necessary, therefore, to differentiate the function of memory in
generating cognitive states from its function in relating different states. In
the former case, memory buffers contain intermediate results, which are
significant for the formation of the cognitive state but irrelevant once it has
been formed. In the other case we are talking about the storage and
retrieval of cognitive end products. (p. 224)
With respect to language comprehension, interpretive processing generates the
cognitive state (syntactically and semantically interpreted sentences), and post-
interpretive processing stores and retrieves those sentences as demanded by
the requirements of other tasks.
Single Resource (SR) Models
Researchers favoring SR models have a different conception of working
memory and its relation to language comprehension. According to the SR model
proposed by Just, Carpenter, and colleagues, working memory consists of a
flexible pool of processing resources that can be used for performing
computations, and for storing the intermediate and final products of those
computations (Just & Carpenter, 1992; Just et al., 1996a; King & Just, 1991).
With respect to sentence processing, the relevant computations include
assigning syntactic structure to sentences and using that structure to decide what
the sentence means. The relevant storage includes storing partially processed
sentential elements, and storing parsed sentential elements for use in other
verbal tasks (i.e., reasoning, planning, and drawing inferences). Thus, in SR
models there is no distinction between interpretive and post-interpretive
processing: Both functions are fulfilled by the same pool of resources. In
addition, SR models hold that the same resources are used for storage and for
performing computations. Thus, there is no distinction between storage
functions that MC models ascribe to the phonological loop, and coordinating
functions that MC models ascribed to the CE. "The theory deals with the
resources used to support language comprehension computations, not the
phonological buffer/articulatory loop of Baddeley's (1992) theory" (Just et al.,
1996a, p.773).
This feature of SR models, the assumption that storage and processing
depend on a common resource pool, is challenged by the neuropsychological
evidence, discussed in the next section, that shows clear evidence of functional
dissociations between storage and CE impairments, and between working
memory and syntactic processing impairments. In one discussion, Just and
colleagues dismiss this inconsistency with neuropsychological data by claiming
that aphasic patients do have working memory deficits (Just et al., 1996a). But
even if this claim is true, it does not account for the fact that there are patients
with working memory impairments (in the CE, the phonological loop, or both) who
are not impaired at interpreting language. If the same pool of resources is used
in processing and storage, it should not be possible to observe such
dissociations.
Just et al. (Just et al., 1996a; Just, Carpenter, Keller, Eddy, & Thulborn,
1996b) described an fMRI study that they claimed supports their proposal that
the same pool of resources is used for sentence comprehension and for working
memory. They compared brain activation in two conditions, one condition in
which subject read sentences, and another in which they read sentences and
maintained in memory the sentence-final word. They found that the read-only
condition activated Wernicke's and Broca's areas, and that the read-and-
maintain condition activated the same areas, along with additional voxels in
Wernicke's area. Just et al. view these results as supporting their contention that
"maintenance draws, in part, on the same resources as does sentence
comprehension" (p. 774). They claim that their SR model makes two predictions:
First, that the two conditions "should activate some of the same brain areas
involved in sentence comprehension" and, second, that "the degree of activation
in a brain area activated by both conditions should be greater in the read-and-
maintain condition because the demand on the common resource pool should be
greater" (Just et al., 1996a, p. 774). These predictions, however, are not unique
to the SR model. MC models, and Caplan & Water's SLIR model, (contrary to
Just et al.'s characterization) also predict overlap in brain areas activated in the
two tasks, and greater activity in the read-and-maintain condition. Both tasks
require subjects to read and make semantic verifications about sentences; thus,
both should activate brain regions used for sentence interpretation and
verification. The read-and maintain condition adds a requirement, demanding
the subjects to perform the additional function of maintaining a list of words. This
additional requirement to store words could explain the additional activation
observed in Wemicke's area, an area that may overlap with the region damaged
in span-impaired patients.
In order to show that sentence comprehension and working memory are
using the same pool of resources, the tasks used to assess the two functions
should not overlap: Sentence comprehension should be assessed by having
subjects read and understand sentences, and working memory should be
assessed by having subjects store and manipulate words. If such a study were
performed, and the results showed entirely overlapping areas of activation in the
in the two tasks, then one could claim that both tasks recruit the same pool of
processing resources. That claim cannot be made based on the tasks used in
Just et al. (Just et al., 1996a; Just et al., 1996b). Finding that the same brain
region is active in more than one task is not surprising, and such an observation
does not indicate that the brain area is performing the same computation in the
two tasks.
B. Neuropsychology
Neuropsychological evidence for a multicomponent verbal working
memory comes from patients with selective impairments in verbal short-term
storage following lesions to the left inferior parietal cortex (Basso, Spinnler,
Vallar, & Zanobio, 1982; Belleville, Peretz, & Arguin, 1992; Saffran & Marin,
1975), or patients with impairments in executive functions following lesions to
prefrontal cortex (Petrides, 1996; Petrides & Milner, 1982). Patients with short-
term storage impairments have a selective deficit in digit and word span (1 to 3
items), but normal long-term memory and relatively normal language
comprehension abilities, at least for short, syntactically simple sentences
(McCarthy, 1987a; McCarthy, 1987b; see Caplan & Waters, 1990 for a review).
Patients with lesions of lateral prefrontal cortex have preserved digit and word
span and normal language comprehension, but may have a range of executive
and attentional deficits (Petrides, 1994; Petrides & Milner, 1982). Baddeley and
Wilson (1988) described a patient with bilateral frontal-lobe lesions who showed
a prototypical pattern of results: impaired attention and motivation, and difficulty
in inhibiting responses; but normal digit span, and a normal recency effect in free
recall, indicating sparing of phonological loop function. Baddeley and colleagues
(Baddeley, Bressi, Sala, Logie, & Spinnler, 1991) have hypothesized that the
primary working memory deficit found in patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD)
is a deficit of executive functions: AD leads to a disproportionate impairment on
dual-task experiments relative to impairments on single tasks. This pattern
suggests that subjects with AD have difficulty coordinating simultaneous
performance on two tasks, a putative function of the CE (Logie, 1996).
Like monkeys with selective lesions, humans with lesions to the lateral
prefrontal cortex are impaired at tasks requiring monitoring within working
memory (Petrides, 1996). For example, subjects have deficits in the self-ordered
choosing task, which requires selection of one stimulus from among a set on
each trial, until all stimuli in the set have been selected without repetition.
Success on this task requires the maintenance and updating of a record of the
responses made on each trial (Petrides & Milner, 1982).
Milner et al. (1985) reviewed evidence that the prefrontal cortex is
necessary for the performance of tasks requiring memory of the temporal
organization of events (i.e., the order of recent events and their frequency). Data
from subjects with unilateral and bilateral excisions of parts of lateral prefrontal
cortex suggest that the deficits reflect interference from information from
preceding trials, rather than an inability to retain new information across a delay.
Frontal cortex appears to be required for the time-marking process that permits
the discrimination of recent and past events.
C. Neuroimaging
Much of the recent work in neuroimaging has been based on the MC
model, and has attempted to separate and localize the different components of
working memory (Awh et al., 1996; Braver et al., 1997; D'Esposito et al., 1995;
Fiez et al., 1996; Paulesu, Frith, & Frackowiak, 1993; Petrides, Alivisatos, Evans,
& Meyer, 1993a; Schumacher et al., 1996; Smith et al., 1995). Results from
neuroimaging studies are consistent with the neuropsychological data: PET and
fMRI studies provide converging evidence that the network for verbal working
memory includes the left-hemisphere posterior parietal cortex hypothesized to
mediate verbal storage; Broca's area and supplementary motor areas
hypothesized to mediate rehearsal; and bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
hypothesized to mediate the manipulation of stored items and the coordination of
concurrent tasks (D'Esposito et al., 1995; Smith et al., 1995; Smith & Jonides,
1997).
In a series of PET studies, Petrides and colleagues have shown that the
self-ordered choosing task described above activates dorsolateral frontal cortex
(area 46 and 9), while an associative learning task activates a more posterior
region (area 8) (Petrides, Alivisatos, Meyer & Evans, 1993). Two order-
monitoring tasks (generate numbers from 1 to 10, avoiding repetition; monitoring
sequence of presented numbers from 1 to 10 for the missing number) led to
activation of dorsolateral frontal cortex (Petrides, Alivisatos, Evans & Meyer,
1993). These results support the hypothesis derived from human and monkey
lesions studies, that this region of dorsolateral frontal cortex is required for
monitoring information within working memory.
In functional neuroimaging studies, a task that has been used extensively
to measure brain activity associated with working memory is the N-back task. In
this task, subjects are asked to monitor a string of stimuli, and to respond when a
target is presented, with a target defined as an item that is the same as one that
occurred n items ago, or "n-back". This task requires subjects to monitor items
within working memory, to temporally tag incoming items and to rapidly update
the contents of storage. Performance on this task activates dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (Awh et al., 1996; Braver et al., 1997; Schumacher et al., 1996;
Smith & Jonides, 1997). This activation is most likely due to the task requirement
of temporally tagging and monitoring the order of presented items (rather than
simply recalling their content), a function shown by lesion studies to rely on
frontal cortex (Milner et al., 1985).
Ill. Interdisciplinary approaches
The study of patients with brain lesions has been tremendously
informative in the attempts to model the role of different brain structures in
working memory. Neuropsychological studies, however, will necessarily leave
some questions unanswered because of the size and heterogeneity of naturally
occurring lesions, and because a lesion will never be confined to one
hypothetical mnemonic component (Milner et al., 1985). For example, the
question of whether the CE is made up of different functional components with
distinct neural substrates will be difficult to address by studying patients with
frontal-lobe lesions. This question, however, has been addressed using a
combination of techniques.
Petrides and colleagues have studied the contributions of prefrontal cortex
to memory, using lesion studies in monkeys, deficit-lesion correlations in
humans, and PET studies of activity in the human brain (Petrides, 1995a;
Petrides et al., 1993a; Petrides et al., 1993b; Petrides & Milner, 1982). These
studies have provided converging evidence that the transient storage of
information is carried out by various modality-specific and multi-modal regions of
posterior cortex. Executive functions are subserved by prefrontal cortex, with
different regions of lateral prefrontal cortex performing different functions: The
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex monitors and manipulates information within
working memory; and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex actively retrieves information
from long-term memory (Petrides, 1994; Petrides, 1995a; Petrides, 1995b;
Petrides, 1996). This model offers an explicit neurobiological representation of
multicomponent models, including evidence for a multicomponent executive
system, and an explanation of the interaction of working memory and long-term
memory. An important feature of this approach is the use of the same, or very
similar, tasks in monkey and human lesion studies and in human neuroimaging
studies. Use of the same tasks allows the synthesis of results across subject
populations and experimental techniques. This multidisciplinary approach is an
encouraging example of cognitive neuroscience in action: building a model that
answers a question of central interest in the study of human cognition, from data
collected using different techniques and methods, in humans and nonhuman
primates.
Chapter 2
Measuring Working Memory:
A Comparison of Some Common Tests
The mystery does not get clearer by repeating the question.
-Rumi, 1088
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Introduction
Baddeley noted more than 20 years ago that a major impediment to
understanding working memory and its relation to other cognitive functions is the
fact that "there are no generally accepted working memory span measures, nor is
it clear how one would validate candidate measures, other than by showing that
they correlate with performance across a wide range of cognitive tasks"
(Baddeley, Logie, Nimmo-Smith, & Brereton, 1985, p. 126). Nonetheless,
researchers continue to use multiple tasks to measure working memory, tasks
that differ markedly in structure, response requirements, and difficulty, and that
may not have been validated by showing that they correlate with other putative
measures of the function. Often, the preferred measure of working memory
differs for different methods (behavioral studies, functional neuroimaging) and
subject groups (young normal subjects, healthy older subjects, and subjects with
neurological diseases), making cross-disciplinary comparisons difficult. Even
within a field, where similar tasks are used (as in the case of the reading span
measure used in psycholinguistic research), there are multiple versions of each
task, and numerous variations in procedure and scoring that make cross-
laboratory comparisons difficult.
This diversity among tests used to measure working memory would not be
a problem if the tests were equivalent. Recent evidence, however, suggests that
scores on commonly used working memory tests may not be highly correlated,
and that the different tests may be differentially sensitive to processes such as
storage, response time, rapid stimulus manipulation, and other executive
functions (Dobbs & Rule, 1989; Lehto, 1996; Waters & Caplan, 1996b). In the
present experiment, I assessed the correlations among several commonly used
measures of working memory capacity, to test the hypothesis that the different
tests are equivalent measures of working memory.
There are two different classes of working memory model:
multicomponent (MC) and single resource (SR) models. In MC models, working
memory is characterized as a set of separate, dissociable components that
interact during the performance of complex cognitive tasks, with different
components contributing to different aspects of task performance (Baddeley,
1983; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley & Hitch, 1994; Gathercole & Baddeley,
1993). In SR models, working memory is characterized as a unitary, limited
capacity pool of processing resources, some concerned with storage and others
with manipulation of information (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Daneman &
Carpenter, 1983; Just & Carpenter, 1992; Just et al., 1996a; King & Just, 1991).
In SR models, the same resources perform processing and storage functions, so
that if a task has high demands for either, the resources available to the other
function will be reduced.
In the standard MC model, proposed and extensively tested by Baddeley
and colleagues (Baddeley, 1996; Baddeley, 1983; Baddeley & Hitch, 1994),
working memory consists of two subsystems dedicated to the storage of verbal
and visuospatial information, respectively, and a CE that coordinates the activity
of the subsystems, and also controls attention allocation, goal monitoring, and
inhibitory functions. The verbal subsystem (the phonological loop) consists of
two parts: The phonological input store, (accessed by subvocal speech or
directly through auditory input), which stores information for about 2 sec; and the
articulatory rehearsal process, which actively refreshes the contents of storage.
In MC models, differences among working memory tests may reflect the fact that
tests measure different components. In this experiment, I examined the relation
between different tests of working memory, and measures of two components
relevant to performance on verbal working memory tests: short-term storage
capacity (thought to reflect phonological loop function) and cognitive speed
(thought to reflect, in part, the efficiency of the CE ) (Richardson, 1996).
The original MC model has been fruitful in generating research in several
different disciplines, including cognitive psychology, neuropsychology, and
neuroimaging. It has been extended by other researchers, who have provided
evidence for multiple visual stores and a multi-component CE, and who have
discussed the interaction between working memory and long-term memory
(Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Lehto, 1996; Logie, 1996; Smith & Jonides, 1997). A
model that defines the components of working memory, what functions they
perform, and how they interact leads to an improved understanding of the
relation between the brain and behavior. It makes the explicit, testable prediction
that different brain lesions should impair different components of working
memory. Patients with such dissociations have been found and studied, and
results have largely supported the model.
Neuropsychological evidence for a multicomponent verbal working
memory comes from patients with selective impairments in verbal short-term
storage following lesions to the left inferior parietal cortex (Basso et al., 1982;
Belleville et al., 1992; Saffran & Marin, 1975) or patients with impairments in
executive functions following lesions to the prefrontal cortex (Petrides, 1996;
Petrides & Milner, 1982). Patients with short-term storage impairments have a
selective deficit of digit and word span (1 to 3 items), but normal long-term
memory and relatively normal language comprehension abilities, at least for
short, syntactically simple sentences (McCarthy, 1987a; McCarthy, 1987b; see
Caplan & Waters, 1990, for a review). Patients with frontal-lobe lesions have
preserved digit or word span and normal language comprehension, but may have
a range of executive and attentional deficits (Petrides, 1994). Baddeley and
Wilson (1988) described a patient with a bilateral frontal-lobe lesion who showed
a prototypical pattern of results: impaired attention and motivation, and difficulty
in inhibiting responses; but normal digit span, and a normal recency effect in free
recall, indicating sparing of phonological loop function. Baddeley and colleagues
(Baddeley et al., 1991) have hypothesized that the primary working memory
deficit found in patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD) is a deficit in executive
functions: AD leads to a disproportionate impairment on dual-task experiments
relative to impairments on single tasks. This pattern suggests that subjects with
AD have difficulty coordinating simultaneous performance on two tasks, a
putative function of the CE (Logie, 1996).
Much of the recent work in neuroimaging has been based on the MC
model, and has attempted to separate and localize the different components of
working memory (Awh et al., 1996; Braver et al., 1997; D'Esposito et al., 1995;
Fiez et al., 1996; Paulesu et al., 1993; Petrides et al., 1993a; Schumacher et al.,
1996; Smith et al., 1995). Results from neuroimaging studies are consistent with
the neuropsychological data: PET and fMRI studies provide converging
evidence that the network for verbal working memory includes left posterior
parietal cortex, hypothesized to mediate verbal storage; Broca's area and
supplementary motor areas, hypothesized to mediate rehearsal; and bilateral
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, hypothesized to mediate the manipulation of stored
items and the coordination of concurrent tasks (D'Esposito et al., 1995; Smith &
Jonides, 1997).
In SR models, the same "resources" are used for storage and performing
computations: There is no distinction between storage functions that MC models
ascribe to the phonological loop and coordinating functions that MC models
ascribed to the CE. This feature of SR models, the assumption that storage and
processing depend on a common resource pool, is challenged by the
neuropsychological evidence discussed above that shows clear evidence of
functional dissociations between impairments in storage and executive functions.
It is not clear how SR theorists would map the concept of a single pool of
processing onto brain function, but it seems reasonable to expect that if the same
pool of resources is used in processing and storage, it should not be possible to
observe dissociations between storage and CE functions.
MC and SR models are associated with different sets of tasks used to
measure working memory. In MC models, tasks may differ depending on what
component of working memory is being assessed. Forward digit and word span
are used to measure phonological loop function, and other more complex tasks
requiring stimulus manipulation are used to measure executive functions
(Baddeley, 1996; Case, Kurland, & Goldberg, 1982; Klapp et al., 1983; Lehto,
1996; Petrides et al., 1993a; Petrides, Alivisatos, Meyer, & Evans, 1993b;
Petrides & Milner, 1982; Smith & Jonides, 1997). In functional neuroimaging
studies, a task that has been used extensively to measure brain activity
associated with working memory is the N-back task. In this task, subjects are
asked to monitor a string of stimuli, and to respond when a target is presented,
with a target defined as an item that is the same as one that occurred n items
ago, or "n-back". This task requires subjects to monitor items within working
memory, to temporally tag incoming items and to rapidly update the contents of
storage (Smith & Jonides, 1997), quintessential executive functions that have
been shown in studies of humans and nonhuman primates to rely on the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Awh et al., 1996; Braver et al., 1997; Petrides,
1991; Petrides, 1995a; Petrides, 1995b; Petrides, 1996; Petrides et al., 1993a;
Petrides et al., 1993b; Petrides & Milner, 1982; Schumacher et al., 1996; Smith &
Jonides, 1997). In the 2-back and 3-back tests most commonly used, the
number of items that must be stored is well below the limited capacity of the
phonological loop (generally around 7 items in college-age subjects). The task
requires that subjects maintain an ordered representation of the last n items
presented, compare incoming items to the appropriate stored item, and update
the contents of storage on each trial. Thus, it seems plausible to hypothesize
that N-back is a relatively pure measure of CE function, and that it may not be
sensitive to the capacity of the phonological loop (i.e., scores on N-back may not
correlate with simple digit and word span).
Other tasks have been hypothesized to tap the CE component of working
memory directly, independently of the phonological loop. These tasks include
the missing digit task used by Klapp and colleagues (Klapp, Marshburn, & Lester,
1983), in which 8 randomly ordered digits between 1 and 9 are presented;
subjects have to report which digit between 1 and 9 was missing from the
sequence. Performance on this test was not improved by rhythmic grouping of
stimuli, and was not disrupted by irrelevant articulation, factors that affect
phonological loop measures such as digit and word span. Lehto (1996) used a
memory updating task, in which subjects were presented with lists of random
digits of varying (but unpredictable) lengths, and asked to recall the last three or
four digits of each list in order. Scores on this task were not correlated with
scores on digit span or word span. Dobbs & Rule (1989) used a working
memory task similar to N-back, in which randomly ordered digits were presented,
and subjects were asked to report either the digit just heard, the digit one ago, or
the digit two ago. Scores on this test did not correlate with storage capacity.
These results indicate a dissociation between the storage and executive
components of working memory, and show that these tests are measures of
some component of executive function that is independent of short-term storage
capacity.
In SR models, no distinction is made between the storage and executive
functions of working memory: Working memory is the total pool of processing
resources, some dedicated to performing computations, and others dedicated to
storing the intermediate and final products of those computations (Case, Kurland,
& Goldberg, 1982; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Daneman & Carpenter, 1983).
The task most commonly used to assess working memory capacity is Daneman
& Carpenter's (1980) reading span task, in which subjects read sets of sentences
and then recall the final word of each sentence in the set. Set size is
systematically increased, and reading span is defined as the largest set of
sentences for which the subject can correctly recall all the final words on the
majority of trials (generally 3 - 5 sentences). According to SR theorists, this task
is interpreted as requiring the simultaneous storage and processing of
information. Many different versions of the reading span task have been used,
as well as other tasks with the same structure (subjects must simultaneously
store and perform computations) but different processing requirements (i.e.,
sentence verification, performing math problems, counting dots, categorizing
words) (Baddeley et al., 1985; Case et al., 1982; Engle, Cantor, & Carullo, 1992;
Turner & Engle, 1989; Waters & Caplan, 1996a). There are significant
correlations among different versions of the task, but even the most highly
related measures share only about half of their variance, showing that there is a
large effect of the specific processing requirement for each version of the test
(Daneman & Merikle, 1996; Waters & Caplan, 1996b).
Correlations of r = .50 - .60 have been observed between different
versions of reading span and word span, a test of short-term storage, indicating
that reading span is sensitive to storage capacity (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980;
Light & A., 1985; Wingfield, Stine, Lahar, & Aberdeen, 1988). SR models,
however, focus on individual differences in working memory capacity, including
age related differences, which may be due to differences in storage capacity,
processing efficiency, or both. Thus, in addition to storage, processing speed is
seen as an important predictor of working memory capacity. SR models predict
that subjects with slow or inefficient processing should have reduced working
memory capacities (Engle et al., 1992). Reduced cognitive processing speed is
the major determinant of age-related declines in scores on the reading span test
(Babcock & Salthouse, 1990; Salthouse, 1990).
Waters & Caplan (1996) presented several criticisms of the traditional
reading span task as a measure of working memory. First, they pointed out that
the task does not require subjects to manipulate the contents of storage, a crucial
aspect of many operational definitions of working memory. The storage and
processing aspects of the task are relatively independent, and subjects may be
making tradeoffs between the processing and recall task demands in different
ways. Strategic differences may reduce the reliability of the test and make the
results difficult to interpret. In addition, while the task requires processing and
storage, only storage is measured. Waters & Caplan compared a number of
different versions of the reading span task: They attempted to measure storage
and processing by recording recall accuracy for the sentence-final words, and
reaction time to sentence verifications. They found moderate-to-high correlations
among the different versions of the task r = .52 - .71), but found that correlations
between the span measures and two other putative working memory measures
(requiring subjects to generate random lists of numbers or shapes), were small or
nonexistent (_r = .07 - .32). Several factors were extracted from a factor analysis
of these data, but no factor was extracted that represented a unitary limited-
capacity working memory system that varied systematically across individuals.
While the reading span measure was initially intended to assess
simultaneous storage and processing, the essence of working memory in SR
theories, there are other possible interpretations of the task requirements.
reading span, and its variants, are basically dual-task experiments, in which
subjects are required to shift their attention between the processing and storage
tasks. Switching attention, and coordinating performance on two tasks, are
fundamental functions of the CE (Baddeley, 1996; Engle, 1996). Based on the
observation of inconsistent effects of high and low memory span on a variety of
tasks (see Engle, 1996 for a discussion), Baddeley (1996) has suggested that
complex span measures, such as reading span, may be differentiating between
subjects who are good and poor strategy users, rather than measuring some
fundamental capacity limitation.
Thus, there are clear differences between different working memory tests:
Some, such as N-back, are hypothesized to measure CE function independent of
short-term storage capacity; while others, such as reading span and its
variations, may measure other aspects of executive function but are also
sensitive to storage capacity. If working memory (or at least CE component, Just
& Carpenter, 1992) is a unitary, single resource, scores on different tests
purporting to measure this resource should be correlated. A few studies have
examined the relation among different working memory tests, and the results
have generally not supported this prediction: Light & Anderson (1985) found a
weak correlation between reading span and backward digit span (r = .34). Lehto
(1996) found that backward digit span was not significantly correlated with
memory updating or reading span (MU r = .32, RS r = .16), while memory
updating and reading span were correlated (r = .57). Dobbs & Rule (1989)
found that backward digit span was not correlated with a test similar to the N-
back task r = .14 - .27).
The results of the experiments reviewed above suggest that working
memory is best conceived as being made up of multiple, interacting components
with different properties, rather than as a single, unitary resource, and that
different tests may measure these different components. In the present
experiment, I sought to extend these findings by directly comparing subjects'
performance on three commonly used working memory tests: N-back, backward
digit span, and reading span. I also used a fourth working memory measure,
category span, which is similar to reading span but incorporates a different
processing task, requiring semantic categorization of words, rather than reading
sentences. I chose this task for two reasons: First, to augment and validate the
reading span measure, by including a task with the same requirements of shifting
between two tasks, but with a different background processing requirement.
Using multiple measures is important to ensure that results are not due to
idiosyncrasies of the materials on any given task (Engle et al., 1992; Turner &
Engle, 1989). Second, the processing requirement of category span (to report
the category of a set of words), requires subjects to search and retrieve from
semantic memory, and thus to require on an additional putative executive
function. Baddeley and Wilson (1988) described a patient with a bilateral frontal
lobe lesion and impairments on a wide range of CE functions. In addition to his
other deficits, he was impaired at generating words from a given semantic
category. In the experiment reported in Chapter 3 I found a high correlation (r =
.65) between reading span and category span, and also found that category span
correlated more highly with a measure of sentence memory capacity than did
Reading Span.
I next examined the relation between the four working memory tests and
two factors that may contribute to working memory capacity, simple storage
ability and cognitive processing speed. In MC models, these two factors reflect
the capacity of different working memory components, the phonological loop and
the CE. Both models predict that working memory measures should be
correlated with measures of processing speed: MC models because speed
reflects the efficiency of the central executive (Richardson, 1996); and SR
models because fast and efficient information processing leaves more resources
available for storage (Just & Carpenter, 1992). Reading span, category span,
and backward digit span, tests that require subjects to store as many items as
possible, should be correlated with storage capacity. N-back, however, is a
measure of the ability to rapidly manipulate and update stored information; it
does not require subjects to store large numbers of items, and thus may not
correlate with storage capacity. If these predictions are correct, then any
attempts to compare results across experiments without taking into account the
factors to which each test is sensitive will be misleading and uninformative. If
scores on the different working memory tests (a) do not correlate with each other
and (b) are predicted by measures of different component variables, this finding
would argue against the idea the working memory is best understood as a
unitary, single resource, contradicting the claims of SR models.
Methods
Subjects
We tested 60 MIT undergraduate and graduate students (age range 18-32
years, mean age 20.2) in two 1-hour experimental sessions on two different
days. Subjects were paid for their participation.
Materials
Working Memory Tests
N-back. Subjects saw words (4-letter abstract nouns) presented one at a
time on the computer screen at the rate of one word every 3 sec (2500 ms word
presentation, 500 ms interstimulus interval). They responded with a button press
whenever they saw a target. A target was defined as a word that was the same
as the word presented N ago, or "N-back." Subjects were first presented with 2-
back targets; if they reached criterion (70% correct) they were presented with 3-
back targets, then 4-back, and then 5-back. There were 70 - 80 trials at each set
size, with 10 correct targets (hits) per set. The score for each set size was
computed by subtracting the number of false alarms from the number of hits to
correct for guessing; then scores for all levels completed were combined to reach
a composite N-back score. The equation for combination was as follows: 1 +
((2-back, % correct) + (3-back, % correct) + (4-back, % correct) + (5-back, %
correct) X 100).
Backward Digit Span (bDS). Subjects heard strings of digits presented at
the rate of 1 digit per sec, and then recalled them in reverse order. Span was
defined as the longest string of digits a subject correctly repeated in reverse
order on at least one of two trials.
Reading Span. Subjects viewed sets of short declarative sentences (5-10
words, mean 7.3) on the computer screen, and read them aloud. Next, subjects
viewed simple questions (probing either the subject or the main verb) and
answered them aloud. After two sentence-question sets, subjects were
prompted to recall the final word of both sentences. Subjects were first
presented with five trials at set-size two; in order to advance to larger set sizes
(three to six), they had to recall all the words correctly on three of the five trials.
Span was defined as the largest set size at which subjects recalled all of the
words correctly on four of the five trials; with an additional .2 added for each trial
they recalled correctly at the next set size.
Category Span. The procedure was the same as for Reading Span,
except that subjects read a list of four nouns, three of which belonged to a
common category (i.e., animals, foods, or colors). The fourth word did not match
the category. On each trial, subjects reported the category name aloud. After
two such trials, subjects recalled the mismatch word for the two lists. If the
subject recalled the two words correctly on three of five trials at set size two, the
set size was increased to three. The largest possible set size was six. Scoring
was the same as for Reading Span.
Short-term Storage Tests
Forward Digit Span (fDS). Subjects heard strings of digits presented at the
rate of 1 digit per sec, and then recalled them in order. Span was defined as the
longest string of digits a subject could repeat correctly, in order, on one of two
trials.
Word Span (WS). Subjects heard lists of words (1-syllable concrete
nouns) presented at the rate of 1 word per sec, and then recalled them in order.
Span was defined as the longest string of words a subject could repeat correctly
in order on one of two trials.
Cognitive Speed Tests
Choice Reaction Time (Choice RT). Two words, "push" and "rest," were
presented, one on the left side and one on the right side of the computer screen.
Subjects looked for the word "push" and pressed the left button on a box if "push"
appeared on the left, and the right button if "push" appeared on the right. "Push"
appeared on the left on half of the 100 trials. The ISI varied randomly between
500 and 2500 ms. Subjects were instructed to respond as quickly as possible
while still being accurate.
Go/No-Go Decision Time (GNG-DT). The words "move" or "stay" were
presented on the screen while subjects held down one button of a two-button
box. If the word "move" appeared, subjects released the first button and hit the
second button as quickly as possible. Decision time was the time that elapsed
between word presentation and the release of the first button. There were 100
trials; "move" was presented on 80% and "stay" on 20% of the trials. Three ISis
were used: 500, 750, and 1000 ms.
Go/No-Go Movement Time (GNG-MT). The task was the same as above.
Movement time was the time that elapsed between releasing the first button and
pressing the second button.
Digit-Digit Matching (DigDig). Pairs of digits were presented at the center
of the screen. Subjects pressed a key marked "S" if the two digits were the
same, and a key marked "D" if they were different. The digits were the same on
half of the 90 trials. Subjects were instructed to respond as quickly as possible
while still being accurate.
Digit-Symbol Matching (DiaSym). A key consisting of the digits 1 to 9,
each paired with an abstract symbol, was presented across the top of the screen.
At the center of the screen, a digit-symbol pair was presented, and subjects had
to decide whether the test pair was the same as the pair in the key. Subjects
pressed a key marked "S" if the digit-symbol pair was the same as the pair in the
key, and a key marked "D" if the pairing was different. Each digit-symbol pair
was probed 10 times, for a total of 90 trials. The digit-symbol pair was the same
on half of the trials. Subjects were instructed to respond as quickly as possible
while still being accurate.
Procedure
On the first day of testing, subject were given the following tests: Forward
Digit Span, Backward Digit Span, Word Span, Reading Span, Category Span,
and N-back. Because superior performance on the working memory tests
resulted in longer testing sessions, half the subjects received the tests in the
above order, while for the other half N-back was tested before Reading Span.
This manipulation allowed us to determine whether fatigue affected performance
on the working memory tests. On the second day of testing, subjects were given
the remainder of the tests in the following order: Choice RT, Go/No-Go, Digit-
Digit, and Digit-Symbol.
Data Analysis
We used three types of statistical analyses: correlation, multiple
regression, and factor analysis. For the correlations, a Bonferroni correction was
performed on the p values in order to control for the increased Type I error
associated with multiple significance tests. Given the number of comparisons
conducted, a p value of p < .001 was required for a correlation to be considered
significant. We calculated stepwise multiple regression analyses of each
working memory variable on the set of storage and cognitive speed variables.
The entry and removal criterion was p = .1. We also performed an oblique
promax factor analysis on the pooled set of all working memory and predictor
variables. Oblique factor analysis differs from orthogonal factor analysis by
allowing the factors to be correlated. The number of factors extracted was based
on Kaiser's stopping rule, which specifies that only those eigenvectors with
eigenvalues of at least 1 should be retained in the model (Bryant & Yarnold,
1995). Squared multiple correlations of each variable with every other variable
were used as the prior communality estimate (Harman, 1976).
Results
Means, standard deviations, and ranges are presented for each of the
working memory tests, and for the seven component variables, in Table 1. A t-
test of the order variable (Reading Span first vs. N-back first) showed no
significant order effect. Four scores, for three subjects, two on Choice RT, one
on GNG-DT, and one on Digit-Digit Matching, were more than three standard
deviations from the group mean; these four scores were replaced with the mean
plus three standard deviations. None of the variables had distributions that
deviated markedly from normality except for Choice RT, GNG-DT, and GNG-MT,
which showed positive skewing. Because the significance tests reported below
assume normality, a log transformation was performed on those three variables,
after which they achieved normality.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Working Memory and Component Tests
Test Mean SD Range
N-back 3.2 0.8 1.5 - 4.7
Backward Digit Span 6.7 1.8 3.0- 10.0
Reading Span 3.9 1.1 2.2 - 6.0
Category Span 2.6 1.0 1.2 - 4.6
Forward Digit Span 8.0 1.3 5.0- 10.0
Word Span 6.3 1.1 4.0 - 9.0
Choice Reaction Time 423 65 315 - 648
Digit-Digit Matching 565 66 439 - 786
Digit-Symbol 1020 151 731 - 1449
Go/No-Go Decision 323 53 244 - 492
Go/No-Go Movement 109 29 59 - 191
Correlations between the working memory tests are presented in Table 2.
Significant correlations were observed between N-back and Backward Digit
Span, and between Reading Span and Category Span. No other correlations
were significant at the p < .001 level; however the correlation between Backward
Digit Span and Reading Span (r = .36) was significant at p < .005. N-back was
not significantly correlated with Reading Span or Category Span (ps < .11).
Table 2. Correlations Among Scores on Working Memory Tests
BDS Reading Span Category Span
N-back .41* .21 .20
Backward Digit Span - .36 .24
Reading Span - .57*
*2<.001
Correlations between the working memory and the storage and speed
variables are presented in Table 3. The storage variables, measured by Forward
Digit Span and Word Span, correlated significantly with Backward Digit Span.
Forward Digit Span and Word Span were significantly correlated (r = .63). Word
Span correlated with Reading Span (r = .53, p < .0001) and to a lesser extent
with Category Span (r = .37; p < .004). N-back, however, was not significantly
correlated with either storage variable at 2 < .001; the correlation between N-
back and Forward Digit Span (r = .33) was significant at p < .01, and the
correlation with Word Span was not significant (p < .14). The correlations
between the working memory variables and the speed variables showed the
opposite pattern of results. The only significant correlations at p < .001 were
between N-back and two of the speed measures, Choice RT and Digit-Digit
Matching. N-back was correlated with the rest of the speed measures to a lesser
degree: Digit Symbol Matching (r =.29, p < .02); GNG-Decision Time (r = .37, p
< .004) and GNG-Movement Time (r = .40, p < .002). Backward Digit Span was
moderately correlated with two of the speed measures, Choice RT (r = .30, p <
.02) and GNG-Decision Time (r = .34, p = .008). The correlations between
Reading Span, Category Span, and the speed measures did not approach
significance.
Table 3. Correlations Between Working Memory and Short-Term Storage and
Speed Tests
N-back BDS Reading Span Category Span
Forward Digit Span .33 .59* .26 .29
Word Span .19 .55* .53* .37
Choice RT .46* .30 .06 .09
DigDig .43* .25 .15 .02
DigSym .29 .08 .08 .05
GNG-DT .37 .34 .09 .16
GNG-MT .40 .25 .12 .05
* p < .001
The results from the stepwise multiple regression analyses are presented
in Table 4, which shows, for each working memory test, the percentage of
variance accounted for by the set of retained predictors, and the p values for
each of these predictors. Only the four predictor variables listed in the table were
significantly related to the working memory variables: Forward Digit Span, Word
Span, Choice RT, and Digit-Digit Matching. Of the variance on Backward Digit
Span, 40% was accounted for by the linear combination of Forward Digit Span
and Word Span. Of the variance on N-back, 27% was accounted for by the
combination of Choice RT and Digit-Digit Matching. Word Span was the only
significant predictor of Reading Span (R2 = .28) and Category Span (R2 = .13).
Table 4. Multiple Regression Analyses for Working Memory Tests: Percentage
Variance Accounted for and p Values for Significant Predictors
R2  fDS Word Span Choice RT DigDig
Backward Digit Span .40 .004 .029 n.s. n.s.
N-back .27 n.s. n.s. .015 .056
Reading Span .28 n.s. .0001 n.s. n.s.
Category Span .13 n.s. .004 n.s. n.s.
In order to explore the underlying relations among these variables, an
exploratory factor analysis was performed. Two factors were extracted based on
Kaiser's stopping rule, (retain only those eigenvectors with eigenvalues of at
least 1) (Bryant & Yarnold, 1995). After the promax rotation, the correlation of
the two factors was .40. The variance of the two factors (variables standardized)
were 3.55 and 2.84 (2.61 and 1.9 when each factor was adjusted for the other).
A variable was considered to load on a factor if it had a factor loading of .3 or
higher (Bryant & Yarnold, 1995). Each variable loaded on only one of the two
factors. All the speed variables as well as the N-back loaded on Factor 1, while
the storage variables and the other three working memory measures loaded on
Factor 2. Factor loading coefficients of each variable on both factors are shown
in Table 4.
Table 4. Factor Loading Coefficients for Each Variable
Test Factor 1 Factor 2
Forward Digit Span .23 .61
Word Span .09 .74
Backward Digit Span .14 .61
Reading Span -.15 .72
Category Span -.13 .62
N-back .47 .19
Choice Reaction Time .75 .01
Digit-Digit Matching .80 -.05
Digit-Symbol Matching .75 -.16
Go/No-Go Decision Time .73 .12
Go/No-Go Movement Time .68 0
Figure 1 shows a path diagram of the factor loadings for each variable. In
the path diagram, the straight arrows indicate a causal effect of the factor on the
variable to which it points. The path coefficient associated with each arrow
indicates how much the variable changed (in units of its SD) when the factor
changed one unit of its own SD. The curved arrow indicates a correlation
between the two factors whose causal basis is not explicated in the model.
.40
.11
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Figure 1. Path diagram of the factor loadings for each variable.
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Discussion
I examined the relation among different commonly used working memory
tests, and found moderate to nonsignificant correlations among them. Using the
strict criterion suggested by a Bonferroni correction (p < .001), only N-back and
Backward Digit Span, and Reading Span and Category Span, were significantly
correlated. Using a more lenient criterion (p < .05), Backward Digit Span and
Reading Span were also significantly correlated. Under no criteria were N-back
and Reading Span or Category Span significantly correlated. Further, the
working memory tests were correlated with different predictor variables:
Backward Digit Span and Reading Span were correlated with storage capacity,
whereas N-back was correlated with measures of cognitive speed. With a lenient
criterion, N-back was related to one of the two measures of storage capacity,
Forward Digit Span (but not Word Span), while Backward Digit Span was
correlated with two speed measures. Again, under no criteria were Reading
Span or Category Span significantly correlated with any speed variables. The
results of the multiple regression and factor analysis helped clarify the relations
among these variables: Multiple regression showed that for N-back, unique
variance was explained only by two of the speed variables; and for Backward
Digit Span, Reading Span, and Category Span, unique variance was explained
only by the storage variables, suggesting that the correlations that might be
considered significant under a more lenient criterion than p < .001 are, in fact,
spurious. Factor analysis showed two moderately correlated factors underlying
the set of variables tested, one of which could be interpreted as a "speed" factor
and the other a "storage" factor. N-back loaded on the first factor, while the
other three tests loaded on the second factor, providing further evidence that
these tests measure dissociable aspects of working memory.
The N-back task is not sensitive to a subject's storage capacity, and is
thus not a measure of the short-term storage component of working memory.
Because of the task demands (subjects must integrate and temporally tag
incoming words, and compare them to the appropriate stored word, then update
the contents of storage) and because of the correlation with the cognitive speed
tests, it is reasonable to hypothesize that N-back is a measure of the rapid
updating and manipulation of information within working memory, and thus a
relatively pure measure of at least some aspects of executive function. It is
unlikely that N-back loaded on the speed factor simply because test items were
presented at a fixed rate, rather than being contingent upon subject's responses,
because the presentation rate was slow (1 word every 3 sec). Subjects were not
instructed to respond as quickly as possible, but were instructed simply to
respond within the 3 sec period. Subjects (who had simple reaction times on the
order of 300 ms) had no difficulty in making responses within this period, and did
not report any difficulty with this task due to the rate of stimulus presentation.
The hypothesis that N-back measures CE functions is consistent with
neuroimaging results showing significant activation in dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex in 2- and 3-back experiments, when the temporal ordering and stimulus
manipulation demands are greatest, but not in 0- and 1-back conditions (Smith &
Jonides, 1997). FMRI studies have also demonstrated that increasing the
difficulty of N-back by increasing N from zero to three leads to increased
activation in a fixed set of brain regions, rather than the recruitment of new areas,
a finding that is consistent with the idea that working memory consists of a fixed
number of basic components (Smith & Jonides, 1997).
What are the task requirements of N-back that give rise to the activation
observed in dorsal prefrontal cortex? N-back requires more than memory for
content: Subjects must remember the order in which items are presented, and
must update the contents of storage on each trial. In humans and monkeys,
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is critical when an experimental task requires
manipulation of stored information, even when the number of items to be
manipulated is less than the subject's storage span (Petrides, 1995, 1996;
Petrides & Milner, 1982; Petrides, Alvisatos, Evans & Meyer, 1993; Petrides,
Alivisatos, Meyer & Evans, 1993). N-back requires more than simply
maintaining a record of the last "n" items presented: The crucial requirement for
success on the N-back task is remembering the order of the stored items, so that
new stimuli can be matched to the appropriate stored item. Memory for temporal
order of events is a function subserved by prefrontal cortex: Milner et al. (1985)
have shown that subjects who underwent unilateral frontal lobectomy were
impaired at judging which of two items they saw more recently, and in judging
how frequently they have seen stimuli. These subjects with temporal ordering
deficits were unimpaired at simple recognition tests with the same stimuli.
Subjects who underwent unilateral temporal lobectomy, by contrast, were
impaired at content recognition but unimpaired at making recency and frequency
judgments. Thus, memory for content and memory for temporal order are doubly
dissociated in brain-lesioned subjects, evidence that the functions are subserved
by separate neural systems.
Performance on the Reading Span test, in contrast to N-back, and in
conflict with predictions of SR models, is not influenced by cognitive speed in
young subjects. Instead, in agreement with previous research (Daneman &
Carpenter, 1980,1983; Light & Anderson, 1985; Wingfield et al., 1988) Reading
Span was correlated with Word Span, a measure of simple storage ability. The
lack of correlation between Reading Span and N-back, and the low correlation
between Reading Span and Backward Digit Span suggests that if, in fact,
Reading Span is measuring some aspect of executive function, it is a different
aspect than that measured by N-back. One possibility is that one or more of the
above tests is simply a poor or unreliable measure of working memory, as has
been argued for Reading Span (Baddeley, 1996; Waters & Caplan, 1996b);
another possibility is that different tests measure distinct executive functions. For
example, it may be that N-back primarily measures updating within working
memory, or memory for temporal order (Smith & Jonides, 1997), while Reading
Span measures attention shifting (Engle, 1996) or efficient strategy use
(Baddeley, 1996). Whichever interpretation is correct, the lack of correlations
among different tests provides clear evidence against SR models that
characterize working memory as a single, unified pool of processing resources.
MC models have proven more useful for the purpose of testing brain-behavior
relations: They allow researchers to make testable predictions about the
number, nature, and interaction between working memory components, and the
integration of neurophysiological data with cognitive models (Smith & Jonides,
1997).
There are some differences between the results reported here and
previous attempts to compare working memory tests. Lehto (1996) used a
Memory Updating task (described in the introduction) that he claimed
independently measured CE function. He found that scores on Memory
Updating correlated with scores on Reading Span, but not Backward Digit Span.
This result is somewhat surprising given the present finding that N-back, which
shares some similar task demands with Memory Updating, correlated with
Backward Digit Span, but not Reading Span. However, this disagreement may
be due to the fact that these tests all measure some overlapping but not identical
aspects of CE function. The current finding, that N-back was the only working
memory test that was sensitive to cognitive speed, suggests that rapid stimulus
manipulation is an important determinant of performance on this test. However,
speed tests such as the ones used here can be considered only indirect indices
of the efficiency of CE functions (Richardson, 1996). An interesting follow-up
experiment that would answer some of the questions raised by this study
regarding what aspects of central executive function different working memory
tests are measuring would be to look at the relation between these tests and
some simple tasks designed to tap different hypothetical CE functions directly,
such as selective or sustained attention, inhibition, or set-shifting. Clearly, an
important goal for future research will be to define and explain the properties of
the CE, the component of working memory that Baddeley (1983) called "the area
of residual ignorance" (p. 315).
Conclusions
These results highlight the fact that tasks used to assess working memory
should be pretested and validated, and that researchers must show the
connection between the task they use as a measure of working memory, and the
function itself. This connection may be demonstrated by presenting an analysis
of the task demands, or by showing that the test is sensitive to the components
of working memory that it is intended to measure. It would be extremely useful if
researchers would perform such validating analyses, and then adopt some
standard versions of tasks that could be used in different laboratories and with
different subject groups. Without such validation and replication, it will be difficult
to develop a model of working memory that will be broadly accepted outside of
the laboratory in which it was generated.
The fact that different working memory tests are not highly correlated, and
that they are correlated with measures of different component variables,
suggests that working memory is best conceived of as a set of interacting
components that are used to different degrees depending on the demands of the
particular cognitive task. Rather than using complex tasks with multiple
demands, a more useful approach to the study of working memory would be to
design simple tests of the different hypothesized component processes. These
tests could then be used to assess patterns of brain activation during functional
neuroimaging, and patterns of impaired and spared test performance in patients
with neurological disease. These data would then be appropriate for comparison
across experimental methods and subject groups, and would aid researchers in
building and refining models of the cognitive and neural bases of working
memory.
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Chapter 3
Working Memory and Remembering Sentences
These shifting and confused gusts of memory
never lasted for more than a few seconds.
-Proust
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Introduction
This chapter addresses the question of the relevant processing unit in
understanding and remembering sentences, and examines the relation between
working memory and memory for sentences. Caplan and Waters (1998)
distinguish two types of linguistic processing: interpretive processing, the
assignment of syntactic and semantic structure to sentences; and post-
interpretive processing, the use of interpreted sentences for other verbal tasks,
such as answering questions, reasoning, and planning actions. Historically, the
clause has been considered the central processing unit for on-line sentence
comprehension (interpretive processing) and for off-line sentence memory (post-
interpretive processing) (Tanenhaus & Trueswell, 1995). However, recent
evidence examining interpretive processing of sentences has challenged this
idea, and has suggested that new discourse referents (agents or events), rather
than clauses, are the relevant units for interpretive processing (Gibson, 1998).
This revised theory of interpretive processing suggests that it would be
appropriate to reanalyze the data underlying the belief that the clause is the unit
of post-interpretive processing. A review of the literature shows that the data
used to support this assumption are open to alternative interpretations:
Specifically, there are a number of confounds in previous studies, and
consequently the data do not unambiguously support the idea that the clause is
the unit of sentence memory. This experiment was designed to determine
whether the clause is the unit of sentence memory, or whether, as in interpretive
processing, sentence memory might be a function of the number of new
discourse referents or content words in the sentence.
In measures of on-line and off-line sentence processing, researchers have
observed large individual differences in performance (speed and/or accuracy of
responses). The most common explanation for this variance is in terms of
individual differences in working memory, the ability to store and manipulate
information used in complex cognitive tasks (Baddeley, 1986; Daneman &
Carpenter, 1980, Just & Carpenter, 1992). An alternative view, recently
proposed by MacDonald & Christiansen (1998), is that working memory used for
language processing does not exist: Individual differences are due to differences
in reading skill and experience with language. The second goal of this study was
to determine whether individual differences in working memory, independent of
reading skill, can explain variance in sentence memory.
The Unit of Sentence Processing
Unit of interpretive processing
An early proposal regarding the unit of interpretive processing was made
by Kimball (1973). He proposed that sentence comprehension was clause-
based, such that at most two partially processed clauses could be maintained in
working memory at one time (cf. the more recent related proposals of Stabler,
1994, and Lewis, 1996). This proposal accounted for the difficulty associated
with processing nested structures such as (1):
(1) [s The student [ who [s the professor [ who [s the scientist collaborated
with ]] had advised ]] copied the article ].
A syntactic category A is said to be nested (or center-embedded) within another
category B if B contains A, a constituent to the left of A, and a constituent to the
right of A. In (1), the relative clause (RC) "who the professor ... had advised" is
nested within the sentence "the student... copied the article". Furthermore, a
second RC "who the scientist collaborated with" is nested within the first
embedded sentence "the professor ... had advised". By contrast, left- or right-
branching structures are much easier to understand than nested structures. For
example, the right-branching structure in (2) has the same meaning as its nested
counterpart in (1) at the level of thematic structure, but it is much easier to
understand:
(2) The scientist collaborated with the professor who had advised the
student who copied the article.
Kimball's clause-based proposal accounts for the contrast between nested and
right-branching RCs as follows. Processing the first subject "the student" in (1)
causes the initiation of a new clause that will be completed when the verb
"copied" and its immediate dependents are located in the input string.
Processing the following two subjects of the embedded RCs ("the professor" and
"the scientist") causes the initiation of two further clauses, resulting in a total of
three partially processed clauses, which is more than the proposed resource
capacity. By contrast, there is never more than one incomplete clause while
processing the right-branching structure in (2), so this sentence is processed
without difficulty.
Although the clause-based proposal accounted for some nesting
complexity effects, recent research has suggested that the difficulty that people
have in processing nested structures is not because of a clause-based
processing mechanism. Rather, nesting complexity seems to depend on two
factors: 1) the number of syntactic heads that are required to form a grammatical
sentence from a partially processed input string; and 2) the number of new
discourse referents that have been processed since each required head was first
known to be required (Gibson, in press). According to this theory, the point of
maximal memory complexity in processing the sentence in (1) occurs at the point
of processing the most embedded subject "the scientist." At this point, there are
five syntactic heads that are required to form a grammatical sentence: 1) the top-
level verb; 2) a verb to head the first RC; 3) an NP empty-category to be
coindexed with the first RC pronoun "who"; 4) a verb to head the second RC; and
5) an NP empty-category to be coindexed with the second RC pronoun "who."
Three new discourse referents have been processed since the prediction of the
top-level verb were made ("the student," "the professor," and "the scientist"), two
new discourse referents have been processed since the prediction of the verb
and empty-category for the first RC ("the professor" and "the scientist"), and one
new discourse referent has been processed since the prediction of the verb and
empty-category for the second RC ("the scientist"). This quantity of predictions
over this many new discourse referents is proposed to be very difficult for the
processor to maintain'.
Empirical evidence for the discourse-based distance metric is provided by
Gibson & Warren (in preparation) who used a complexity rating questionnaire to
show that doubly nested RC structures are easier to process when a first- or
second-person pronoun is in the subject position of the most embedded RC, as
in (3), as compared with a similar structure in which an NP introducing a new
object into the discourse is in the subject position of the most embedded clause,
as in (1) (Bever, 1970; Gibson, 1991; Kac, 1981):
(3) The student who the professor who I collaborated with had advised
copied the article.
(4) Isn't it true that example sentences [ that people [ that you know ]
produce ] are more likely to be accepted? (De Roeck et al., 1982)
The lower complexity of nested structures like (3) and (4) can be accounted for if
the memory increment for a predicted category is larger for new discourse
referents than for referents that are already part of the current discourse, such as
first- or second-person pronouns. (The current discourse always includes a
speaker/writer and a hearer/reader.) In particular, if there is no memory cost
1 It is also claimed that the prediction of the top-level verb is cost-free, but this
claim is tangential to the issues under consideration here.
increment for predicted heads when a referent that is already part of the current
discourse is processed, then only two new discourse referents have been
processed since the top-level verb was predicted, only one new discourse
referent has been processed since the prediction of the verb and empty-category
for the first RC ("the professor"), and no new discourse referents have been
processed since the prediction of the verb and empty-category for the second
RC. As a result, the memory cost at this point is substantially less than the
maximal complexity of processing a sentence like (1). Note that a clause-based
proposal does not predict this complexity contrast, because there are three
partially processed sentences at the most embedded subject of (3) and (4), just
as in (1).
Another example of a construction that violates Kimball's clause-based
explanation of interpretive processing is an RC embedded within a sentential
complement (SC) of a noun:
(5) SC/RC structure: The possibility that the administrator who the nurse
supervised had lost the medical reports bothered the intern.
The acceptability of the SC/RC structure does not follow from the clause-based
proposal: There are three partially processed clauses at the point of processing
the most embedded subject NP "the nurse" in (5). Thus an SC/RC structure
should be just as complex as a doubly nested RC structure, but an SC/RC
structure is much easier to (Cowper, 1976; Gibson, 1991; Gibson & Thomas,
1997). This difference is explained by the theory based on incomplete
dependencies. Unlike an RC, there is no RC pronoun in an SC, with the
consequence that an SC does not require an empty category to occur in the
clause. As a result, there are only four syntactic heads required at the most
embedded position in (5), and thus its lower complexity is accounted for. Given
the shift in recent theory from an interpretive processing mechanism based on
clause units to one based on incomplete head-dependency relationships and the
number of new discourse referents, it is worthwhile to investigate whether the
evidence for clause-based post-interpretive processing might be reinterpreted as
well.
Units of post-interpretive processing
Clauses, and not within-clause phrase boundaries, appear to be the units
of segmentation during speech perception: Clicks occurring during the auditory
presentation of sentences are misheard to occur between clause boundaries but
not between phrase boundaries or between individual words (Bever et al., 1969).
Controlling for lexical items and serial position, words occurring in recent clauses
are recognized more quickly than words occurring in early clauses (Caplan,
1972; Chang, 1982). Early research examining post-interpretive sentence
processing, and the capacity of sentence memory, appears to show that the
clause is the unit of sentence memory, as well. Several pieces of evidence
support this assumption: First, memory declines as a function of the number of
clauses in the sentences (Blauberg & Braine, 1974). Second, verbatim recall is
highly accurate for the most recent clause heard, but not for earlier clauses
(Jarvella, 1971).
However, there are a number of other candidate units of sentence
memory: Memory could be a function of the number of words in the sentence,
the number of content words (noun phrases (NP), verb phrases (VP), adjectives,
etc.), or the number of new discourse referents. Glanzer and Razel (1974)
showed that short, familiar sentences (proverbs) could be held as units in short-
term memory, but that unfamiliar sentences were recalled less accurately,
suggesting that not all clauses can be held as chunks in short-term storage.
While it is unlikely that memory will simply be a function of the number of words
in the sentence (given the ample experimental evidence (Gershberg &
Shimamura, 1995; Larkin & Burns, 1977; Miller, 1956; Miller & Isard, 1964)
showing that meaningful word strings are recalled more accurately than
unrelated lists), the studies reviewed above do not rule out the other alternatives.
The confounds in these studies will be discussed below; because of these
confounds, the results do not unambiguously support the assumption that
clauses are the units of sentence memory.
One study that has been used to support the idea that clauses are the
units of sentence memory was conducted by Blauberg and Braine (1974).
Subjects were presented with 30 sentences, six at each length from 2-6 clauses,
and then presented with a probe, one of the clauses from the sentence with the
subject or object noun missing, and asked to produce the appropriate noun.
Recall accuracy declined as a function of the number of clauses in the sentence,
with an average of 6/6 probe questions answered correctly for 2-clause
sentences, and 3/6 probes answered correctly for 6-clause sentences. While
these results show that memory declines as a function of the number of clauses
in the sentence, they do not show that the clause is the unit of sentence memory.
Sentences with more clauses were longer, and thus it is impossible to determine
whether the difficulty with long sentences was due to their greater length, or their
greater number of clauses. Determining whether clauses are the units of
sentence memory requires a comparison of sentences in which the effects of the
number of words and the number of clauses can be separated.
A second study purporting to show that clauses are the units of sentence
memory was conducted by Jarvella (1971). He played subjects connected
discourse that was periodically interrupted, with subjects instructed to recall as
much of the previous material as possible. He examined recall accuracy for the
most recently heard two (Experiment 2) or three (Experiment 1) clauses. Overall,
he found that the most recent clause was recalled highly accurately, with earlier
clauses recalled less accurately, results that appeared to support the idea of
clause-based processing. However, there are two problems with the
experimental materials and methods that preclude one from interpreting these
results as support for clause-based processing. First, the results of Experiment 2
showed that while there was an overall effect of clause position (early vs. recent),
when the two clauses were within the same sentence, recall was still accurate for
the earlier clause, (early clause = .84, recent clause = .97), whereas when they
were in different sentences, recall was much more accurate in the most recent
clause (.95) than in the earlier clause (.63). This result provides more support for
the idea that sentences are the units of memory, rather than clauses. But
problems with the materials render even this interpretation problematic: When
the recent and early clauses were in different sentences, the sentence containing
the early clause was more complex than when the recent and early clauses were
in the same sentence. Sample sentences from Jarvella (1971) illustrate this
problem:
(1) Early clause in same sentence: He and the others were labeled as
Communists. McDonald and his top advisors hoped this would keep
Rarick off the ballot.
(2) Early clause in previous sentence: That he could be intimidated was
what McDonald and his top advisors hoped. This would keep Rarick
off the ballot.
While the words in the final two clauses ([MacDonald and his top advisors
hoped] [this would keep Rarick off the ballot]) are identical in the two conditions,
the sentence structure in (2) is much more complex. The first sentence in (2)
contains the cleft sentential subject "that he could be intimidated," which is much
harder to understand than the simpler subject-verb-object sequence in (1)
(Frazier & Rayner, 1988; Gibson, in press). This factor would render the
sentences in (2) much harder to recall, especially to recall verbatim, as was
required in this study. Measuring verbatim recall is the second weakness of this
experiment: Requiring subjects to recall sentences verbatim focuses on the
surface structure of sentences, rather than the conceptual or propositional
content. Potter and colleagues have provided evidence that verbatim recall,
relying on a briefly held phonological record, can be dissociated from memory for
the conceptual content of sentences, memory that retains an abstract
representation of propositional content without retaining the exact lexical or
syntactic form of the sentence (Lombardi & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1993; Potter &
Lombardi, 1990; Potter, Moryadas, Abrams, & Noel, 1993; Potter, Valian, &
Faulconer, 1977). Even if the experiments in Jarvella (1971) had succeeded in
showing that clauses are the units of verbatim recall, this finding could not be
used as evidence that clauses are the units of sentence memory when sentence
content is probed, rather than surface form and lexical items.
Although the evidence that the clause is the unit of segmentation during
speech perception is convincing (Bever et al., 1960; Caplan, 1972; Chang,
1982), neither Blauberg & Braine (1974) or Jarvella (1971) provide conclusive
evidence that the clause is the unit of sentence memory. Given the recent
evidence showing that discourse referents are the units of interpretive processing
(Gibson, 1998), I considered it worthwhile to conduct an experiment to determine
whether the unit of post-interpretive processing is (a) the clause or (b) the
discourse referent.
The Role of Working Memory in Memory for Sentences
Working memory and understanding language
The most influential model of working memory is the multicomponent (MC)
model proposed by Baddeley and colleagues (Baddeley, 1996; Baddeley, 1983;
Baddeley & Hitch, 1994), which has been extended and modified by other
researchers (Lehto, 1996; Martin & Romani, 1994; Smith & Jonides, 1997). In
MC models, the verbal part of working memory consists of at least two
components: The short-term store (STS), used for storing and rehearsing verbal
information using a phonological code 2 (Awh et al., 1996; Baddeley, 1996; Basso
et al., 1982; Fiez et al., 1996; Paulesu et al., 1993; Vallar, Betta, & Silveri, 1997);
and the central executive (CE), used for allocating attention, planning, inhibiting
nonrelevant responses, and coordinating resources demanded by concurrent
tasks (Baddeley, 1996; D'Esposito et al., 1995; Lehto, 1996). Answering
questions about sentences could depend primarily on the STS, the CE, or both.
One goal of the current experiments is to determine whether the STS and the CE
make independent contributions to sentence memory capacity.
Gathercole & Baddeley have hypothesized that the STS and the CE make
dissociable contributions to language understanding (Gathercole & Baddeley,
1993). For sentence processing, the STS is used to maintain a phonological
record of sentences just heard or read, a record that can be consulted off-line
during post-interpretive processing. Such a record would be particularly useful
for sentences that are initially understood incorrectly and must be reanalyzed
(i.e., The cotton clothing is made of is grown in Mississippi), or that contain a long
list of items to be remembered (i.e., Please go to the store and buy bread, milk,
eggs, cheese, oranges and spinach). Evidence for the role of the STS in post-
2 In Baddeley's model, passive verbal storage includes two components: the phonolgical store,
used for holding information, and the articulatory loop, used to rehearse information using a
speech-based code (Baddeley, Vallar, & Wilson, 1987; Baddeley, 1983);. Such a fine-grained
interpretive processing includes the finding that subjects are impaired at
comprehending long, complex sentences when they have to concurrently
articulate irrelevant words (articulatory suppression) (Baddeley, Eldridge, &
Lewis, 1981).
An early idea about the role of STS in language comprehension held that
sentence comprehension requires an ordered, verbatim representation of the
words just heard. However, this idea was contradicted by the discovery that
patients with a severe deficit in the STS (digit or word spans of one to four items)
are relatively unimpaired in understanding language (Baddeley et al., 1987;
Basso et al., 1982; Belleville et al., 1992; Martin, 1987; Martin, 1993; McCarthy &
Warrington, 1987a; McCarthy & Warrington, 1987b; Saffran & Marin, 1975; Vallar
et al., 1997). When tested in detail, such patients show impairment only in
understanding very long or complex sentences (see Caplan & Waters, 1990, for
a review). Other results that questioned the relevance of a verbatim
representation for sentence comprehension come from Potter and colleagues,
who found that people quickly form conceptual representations of sentence
meaning while losing information about the exact words and syntactic structure
(Lombardi & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1993; Potter & Lombardi, 1990; Potter et al.,
1993; Potter et al., 1977). Such evidence indicates that the STS is not crucial for
first-pass comprehension, although it may be useful for higher-level linguistic
interpretations that lag behind on-line comprehension processes.
analysis is not relevant to the hypotheses under investigation here, so for the sake of simplicity
we are including both components in the STS.
According to Gathercole & Baddeley, the CE is used for syntactic and
semantic processing, and for storing the intermediate and final products of such
processing during performance of post-interpretive tasks (i.e., answering
questions, verifying the truth of statements, reasoning from given propositions).
The CE has also been claimed to be important for integrating new propositions
with representation of a text and maintaining the predicate-argument structure of
propositions (Caplan & Waters, 1998; Gathercole & Baddeley, 1993; Kintsch &
van Dijk, 1978). Evidence for the role of the CE in sentence memory includes
the fact that tasks like Daneman & Carpenter's (1980) Reading Span, which
require the coordination of storage and processing (a CE function), correlate
more highly with measures of reading comprehension (i.e., verbal SAT,
answering factual questions about a passage, or understanding pronoun
referents) than do measures of STS alone (i.e., digit or word span). Another
source of evidence about the role of the CE in sentence memory comes from
examining the performance of patients with impaired CE function. Patients with
Alzheimer's disease (AD) have severe impairments in CE functions (Baddeley et
al., 1991; Baddeley, Logie, Bressi, Sala, & Spinnler, 1986). Waters and
colleagues (Waters & Caplan, 1997; Waters, Caplan, & Rochon, 1995) have
presented evidence that patients with AD are impaired in post-interpretive
processing of sentences with more than one proposition, and are more disrupted
than control subjects under dual-task conditions, which require the coordinating
function of the CE. These results suggest that the CE may be crucial for normal
post-interpretive sentence processing.
Measuring working memory
Any researcher attempting to measure working memory capacity faces a
serious challenge in deciding what test to use. A review of the working memory
literature shows that several very different tasks are commonly used to assess
working memory (Baddeley et al., 1985; Braver et al., 1997; Case et al., 1982;
Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Daneman & Merikle, 1996; Dobbs & Rule, 1989;
Engle et al., 1992; Klapp et al., 1983; LaPointe & Engle, 1990; Petrides et al.,
1993b; Salthouse, 1990; Turner & Engle, 1989; Waters & Caplan, 1996b).
Several recent studies, however, have suggested that scores on commonly used
working memory tests may not in fact be highly correlated, and that the different
tests may be differentially sensitive to processes such as storage, response time,
rapid stimulus manipulation, and other CE functions (Dobbs & Rule, 1989; Lehto,
1996; Waters & Caplan, 1996b). The experiment reported in Chapter 2
compared performance on several different tests of working memory, and found
that they were not highly intercorrelated, and that scores on different tests were
predicted by measures of different component variables (short-term storage and
processing speed). These results suggest that different working memory tests
are sensitive to different components of working memory.
Determining whether the STS and the CE make independent contributions
to sentence memory requires independent measures of the two components.
For the STS, such a measure is straightforward: STS capacity is measured
using a task like word span or digit span that requires subjects to recall items
exactly as presented, with no manipulation or computation required. However,
measuring the CE provides more of a challenge: There are no widely accepted
and uncontroversial measures of working memory itself (Baddeley et al., 1985;
Waters & Caplan, 1996b), and most of the commonly used working memory tests
require subjects to store as many items as possible while performing
computations or manipulations. For example, backward digit span is considered
to be a test of working memory, rather than simply a measure of STS capacity, in
that it requires subjects perform a manipulation, order reversal, on the contents
of storage. But the measure of capacity is the number of digits that can be
recalled in reverse order, which will probably depend on the capacity of the STS.
In Daneman & Carpenter's (1980) Reading Span test, subjects are required to
store as many sentence-final words as possible while concurrently processing
sentences. Performance on such tasks depends not only on how efficiently a
subject can process or manipulate stimuli (CE functions), but also on how many
items a subject can store (capacity of the STS).
There are a few working memory tests that appear to be relatively pure
measures of the CE independent of the capacity of the STS. These tests
require subjects to monitor and manipulate stimuli, or update the contents of
storage, but do not require subjects to store a large number of items: Any
storage requirements of such tasks is well below the limits of the STS. For
example, in the N-back test, subjects are asked to monitor a string of stimuli, and
to respond when a target is presented, with a target defined as an item that is the
same as one that occurred n items ago, or "N-back." This task has been used
extensively in neuroimaging studies, and has been shown to activate areas in
prefrontal cortex thought to be the neural substrate of the CE component of
working memory (Awh et al., 1996; Braver et al., 1997; D'Esposito et al., 1995;
Schumacher et al., 1996; Smith & Jonides, 1997). In the 2-back and 3-back tests
most commonly used, the number of items that must be stored is well below
subject's STS capacity, but requires subjects to maintain an ordered
representation of the last N items presented, to compare incoming items to the
appropriate stored item, and to update the stored items on each trial. The results
in Chapter 2 demonstrated that N-back does not correlate with STS capacity
(measured by digit span or word span) whereas two other working memory tests,
backward digit span and reading span, do correlate with STS. These results
suggest that N-back is a relatively pure measure of CE function. I addressed the
question of the relative contribution of the STS and the CE to sentence memory
capacity by examining (a) the correlation between Word Span (a measure of
STS) and sentence memory, (b) the correlation between N-back (a measure of
the CE) and sentence memory, and (c) a multiple regression of Word Span and
N-back on sentence memory, to determine whether each test accounts for
independent variance in the sentence memory score.
The relation between working memory and language comprehension or
other cognitive functions has been assessed using two different analytic
techniques: correlational studies and the individual differences approach. In
correlational studies (Babcock & Salthouse, 1990; Case et al., 1982; Daneman &
Carpenter, 1980; Daneman & Carpenter, 1983; Daneman & Merikle, 1996; Engle
et al., 1992; LaPointe & Engle, 1990; Turner & Engle, 1989; Waters & Caplan,
1996b), subjects are given a variety of tests of working memory and other
cognitive functions, and correlations, multiple regressions, and factor analyses
are used in order to determine what variables are related to the cognitive function
of interest. These practices allow researchers to determine relations among
large numbers of variables, and the extent to which different tests contribute
common and unique variance to the measure of interest (Engle et al., 1992).
One limitation of correlational approaches is that multiple comparisons require
large numbers of subjects in order to be reliable. Another problem in the
literature (although not inherent in the approach) is that with large numbers of
subjects, statistically significant correlations may account for only a small amount
of the variance on a given test. For example, with a large number of subjects, an
r of .25 may be statistically significant at the p < .05 level, but would explain less
than 10% of the variance. Such a small correlation would not constitute a
sufficient explanation of the relation between the correlated variables.
The second approach to studying the relation between working memory
and language is the individual differences approach (Just & Carpenter, 1992;
Just et al., 1996a; King & Just, 1991; King & Kutas, 1995; MacDonald, Just, &
Carpenter, 1992; Miyake, Carpenter, & Just, 1994a; Miyake, Carpenter, & Just,
1995; Miyake, Just, & Carpenter, 1994b). In this method, subjects are given a
test designed to measure working memory capacity, such as Reading Span, and
then divided on the basis of their scores into three groups, a high-, medium-, and
low-span group. Usually, the medium-span group is omitted from further
analyses, and the high- and low-span groups are compared, using ANOVAs, on
another measure of interest, such as reading speed or sentence comprehension.
The groups are treated as though they are independent and homogeneous, and
are compared to see whether they perform differently on the secondary task
(Engle et al., 1992). This approach, however, has some significant flaws: First,
leaving out the subjects in the middle of the sample ignores a large amount of
data, including information about the variability of the sample. Second, this
approach may in fact lead to an overestimation of the relation between variables.
Selecting only extreme groups eliminates those subjects whose scores would be
near the mean of the sample, leaving subjects whose scores have larger
deviations from the mean. As a result, the correlation coefficient is likely to be
larger with extreme groups (for a discussion see McCall, 1998, pp. 168-169).
Third, the choice of a cutoff point seems arbitrary if inspection of a scatterplot
does not suggest any natural grouping of the data. For these reasons, the
correlational approach is superior unless scatterplots show a natural grouping of
the data.
Sentence memory without working memory
MacDonald and Christiansen (1998) have recently presented an
alternative to the currently dominant view of the relation between working
memory and language processing. They claim that there is no linguistic working
memory capacity separate from linguistic representations and processes. In this
view, measures of language processing and measures of linguistic working
memory are simply different measures of language processing skill. Individual
differences supposedly due to differences in working memory capacity are due to
differences in skill and experience with language.
MacDonald & Christiansen point out that "the fact that subjects are tested
on tasks that are called 'working memory tasks' does not entail that the construct
of a working memory separate from processing is a valid one" (p.3). While this
statement is certainly true, and MacDonald & Christiansen's hypothesis has the
appeal of offering an alternative to relying on differences in a poorly defined and
measured working memory capacity, this view does not provide a convincing
alternative that explains the existing data. First, it is not clear that it is actually an
alternative: the explanation for individual differences (differences in language
processing skill) translates easily into working memory models such as those of
Just and Carpenter (1992), or Salthouse (1990), which view working memory
capacity as the interaction of storage capacity and processing efficiency. In
these models, individual differences on working memory tests could be due to
differences in storage capacity, processing efficiency, or both. Thus MacDonald
& Christiansen's alternative could be seen as a case of differences in a specific
kind of processing efficiency (reading skill) explaining individual differences in
language processing tasks and linguistic working memory tasks.
MacDonald & Christiansen's account, however, addresses only the
relation between language processing and linguistic measures of working
memory, such as Daneman and Carpenter's (1980) Reading Span, or the
auditory analog, Listening Span, both of which involve reading and remembering
the final words of sentences. The fact that these tasks require reading or
listening to sentences makes it plausible to suppose that any individual
differences observed may be due to differences in reading skill. But this
explanation would not account for the correlations that have been observed
between reading comprehension and nonlinguistic tasks of working memory
(Daneman & Merikle, 1996; Turner & Engle, 1989; Engle et al., 1992). A skill-
via-experience account, in which better readers do better in reading
comprehension and in linguistic working memory tasks, offers no explanation for
correlations among linguistic and non-linguistic working memory tasks, and no
explanation for correlations between working memory, as measured by these
tasks, and sentence memory.
Experiment
The experiment consisted of two parts: Part 1 tested subjects' sentence
memory capacity. Over headphones, subjects heard sentences of different
lengths, from two to five clauses. Sentences were semantically unconstrained:
Any agent could plausibly perform any action in the sentence. Immediately
following the sentence, subjects heard a question, probing their memory for one
of the clauses in the sentence. In order to ensure that subjects paid attention to
all parts of the sentence, two types of probes were presented: questions probing
memory for either the subject of the clause (Agent questions) or the main verb
(Action questions). For all clauses in the sentences except the final clause, there
were an equal number of probes at each serial position. The final clause of the
sentence was never probed.
In order to address the question of the unit of memory, three different
sentence types were assessed: Sentences with relative clauses (RC), sentential
complements (SC) , and relative clause with double objects (DO) (two NPs or 1
NP and 1 PP) . DO sentences with the same number of clauses were longer
(containing one additional new discourse referent per clause) than RC and SC
sentences. In fact, DO sentences at a given length (n) contained the same
number of new discourse referents as RC and SC sentences at length n+1.
Thus, if memory is a function of the number of clauses, there should be no
difference between DO sentences and the other two sentence types. However, if
memory is a function of the number of new discourse referents in the sentence,
then accuracy on DO sentences should be worse than the other two sentence
types: DO sentences of length n should be recalled as poorly as the other two
sentence types at length n+1.
Part 2 tested subjects' short-term storage and working memory capacity.
Several different working memory measures were used, in order to explore the
relation among them and replicate the results in Chapter 2. The tests are
described in the Methods section, and zero-order correlations are reported in the
Appendix. However, in order to facilitate interpretation of the results and to
reduce the number of comparisons to a statistically permissible level, the
discussion focuses on a subset of those tests: Word Span, Backward Digit
Span, N-back, and a Complex Span measure derived by forming a composite
score from three different tests modeled on Daneman & Carpenter's (1980)
Reading Span test: Reading Span, Math Span, and Category Span. The tests
are described in detail in the Methods section; the composite score was used in
order to obtain a measure of simultaneous storage and processing capacity that
was independent of the processing task. In order to form a composite measure,
it was necessary to modify Daneman & Carpenter's original procedure so that the
task demands of the three tests were identical: The only difference between
them was the background processing task and the item to recall. Combining
several tasks into a composite measure rules out the possibility that any
observed relation between the variables might be due to the materials used in
this study, or to the fact that Reading Span and sentence memory may both be
sensitive to a third factor, subject's reading skill (MacDonald & Christiansen,
1998). Controlling for these alternative explanations is especially important given
that there are so many versions of the original Reading Span measure, and very
few attempts have been made to validate and compare different versions
(Baddeley et al., 1985; Daneman & Merikle, 1996; Turner & Engle, 1989; Waters
& Caplan, 1996b).
Method
Part 1: Sentence Memory
Subjects
Thirty MIT students served as subjects. All subjects were native English
speakers. Subjects were paid $8 for their participation.
Materials
Each subject heard 121 sentences of four different lengths, 2-clause, 3-
clause, 4-clause, and 5-clause. Three types of sentences were used: RC, SC,
and DO. The Question Type (Action vs. Agent) and Probe Location (1st, 2 nd, 3 rd
or 4 th clause) variables were balanced across the sentence types, such that
equal numbers of the two question types and locations were probed for each
sentence type. Order was randomized, then the same set of sentences were
presented to each subject. A sample 3-clause sentence of each type is
presented in Table 1. All clauses, except the final clause, were semantically
unconstrained: Sentences were constructed using a program that randomly
assigned subjects with verbs for all but the final clause in the sentence. The final
clause (which was never probed) was constructed to be semantically plausible to
provide some conceptual closure to the sentence. Except for the final clause,
each serial position was probed equally often. For RC and DO sentences,
probes consisted of two question types, in order to optimize comprehension and
attention to the entire sentence: Agent questions (Who lectured someone?) and
Action questions (What did the barber do?). Because SC sentences did not
have a single NP object, only Agent questions were used.
Table 8. Sample 3-Clause Sentences
Relative Clause (RC) The barber lectured the sailor who hit the singer
who worked in the jazz club.
Sentential Complement The violinist insisted that the immigrant doubted
(SC) that the chef had trained in Paris.
Double Object (DO) The psychologist showed the document to the
criminal who sent a gift to the editor who was
compiling an anthology.
Procedure
Sentences were recorded onto a Macintosh Quadra 640 computer using
Sound Designer II software, and were played back to the subject over
headphones. Sentences were read naturally. Immediately following sentence
presentation, subjects heard a question about the sentence, which they
answered aloud. Subjects pressed the spacebar when they were ready for the
next sentence. The experimenter marked the accuracy of the subject's response
on a scoresheet. Agent questions were scored 1 if they were answered correctly
and 0 if they were answered incorrectly. Action questions were scored 1 if both
parts of the answer were correct (the verb and the object), .5 if one part was
correct, and 0 if both parts were incorrect or omitted. The experimental session
began with 6 practice sentences, followed by the 121 test sentences. The
session lasted approximately 30 minutes.
Part 2: Working Memory
Subjects
Twenty-six subjects who had participated in Part 1 returned on a second
day to participate in Part 2.
Materials
Short-Term Storage Tests
Forward Digit Span (fDS). Subjects heard strings of digits presented at the
rate of 1 digit per sec, and then recalled them in order. Span was defined as the
longest string of digits a subject could repeat correctly, in order, on one of two
trials.
Word Span (WS). Subjects heard lists of words (1-syllable concrete
nouns) presented at the rate of 1 word per sec, and then recalled them in order.
Span was defined as the longest string of words a subject could repeat correctly
in order on one of two trials.
Working Memory Tests
Backward Digit Span (bDS). Subjects heard strings of digits presented at
the rate of 1 digit per sec, and then recalled them in reverse order. Span was
defined as the longest string of digits a subject correctly repeated in reverse
order on at least one of two trials.
N-back. Subjects saw words (4-letter abstract nouns) presented one at a
time on the computer screen at the rate of one word every 3 sec (2500 ms word
presentation, 500 ms interstimulus interval). They responded with a button press
whenever they saw a target. A target was defined as a word that was the same
as the word presented N ago, or "N-back." Subjects were first presented with 2-
back targets; if they reached criterion (70% correct) they were presented with 3-
back targets, then 4-back, and then 5-back. There were 70 - 80 trials at each set
size, with 10 correct targets (hits) per set. The score for each set size was
computed by subtracting the number of false alarms from the number of hits to
correct for guessing; then scores for all levels completed were combined to reach
a composite N-back score. The equation for combination was as follows: 1 +
((2-back, % correct) + (3-back, % correct) + (4-back, % correct) + (5-back, %
correct) X 100).
Reading Span. Subjects viewed sets of short declarative sentences (5-10
words, mean 7.3) on the computer screen, and read them aloud. Next, subjects
viewed simple questions (probing either the subject or the main verb) and
answered them aloud. After two sentence-question sets, subjects were
prompted to recall the final word of both sentences. Subjects were first
presented with five trials at set-size two; in order to advance to larger set sizes
(three to six), they had to recall all the words correctly on three of the five trials.
Span was defined as the largest set size at which subjects recalled all of the
words correctly on four of the five trials; with an additional .2 added for each trial
they recalled correctly at the next set size.
Math Span (MS) - The procedure was the same as for Reading Span,
except that subjects saw a simple addition problem, and reported the sum aloud.
After two such trials, subjects recalled the second digit of each of the two
problems aloud. If the subject recalled the two digits correctly on three of five
trials at set size two, the set size was increased to three. The largest possible
set size was six. Scoring was the same as for Reading Span.
Category Span. The procedure was the same as for Reading Span,
except that subjects read a list of four nouns, three of which belonged to a
common category (i.e., animals, foods or colors). The fourth word did not match
the category. On each trial, subjects reported the category name aloud. After
two such trials, subjects recalled the mismatch word for the two lists. If the
subject recalled the two words correctly on three of five trials at set size two, the
set size was increased to three. The largest possible set size was six. Scoring
was the same as for Reading Span.
Counting Span (CountSp) - The procedure was the same as for Reading
Span, except that subjects saw sets of yellow and blue dots on the screen,
counted the yellow dots, and reported the number aloud. After two such trials,
subjects said aloud the number of yellow dots that they had counted on each of
the two screens. If the subject recalled the two numbers correctly on three of five
trials at set size two, the set size was increased to three. The largest possible
set size was six. Scoring was the same as for Reading Span. Notice that this
task differs from the three above tasks: Subjects report the same thing after the
set of trials (the number of yellow dots on each trial) as they report aloud
following each trial. In the previous tests, the item to recall following the set of
trials was different from the item reported on each trial.
Procedure
Subjects were tested in the following order: forward Digit Span, backward
Digit Span, Word Span, N-back. Testing order was held constant for all subjects
because we planned to use correlations between scores and thus wanted factors
such as practice and fatigue to be held constant. Then, the four complex span
measures were presented in pseudorandom order, with the condition that the two
tests requiring word recall (Reading Span and Category Span) and the two tests
requiring number recall (Math Span and Counting Span) never occurred
consecutively. Testing order for these for the complex span measures was
randomized because we planned to combine scores into a composite that would
equally reflect the contribution of each score; thus fatigue and practice effects
should be distributed equally across the four tests. The experimental session
lasted approximately 1 hour.
Data Analysis
For RC and DO clauses, ANOVAs were performed at each clause length
to determine whether there was an effect of probe question type (Action vs.
Agent). There were no significant differences between question types at any
clause length, so for all further analyses the two question types were combined.
For the purpose of correlations, the mean score on the 3-clause
sentences was used, because these scores showed the largest individual
differences. Scores at the other sentence lengths might have restricted ranges
due to ceiling and floor effects. Correlations for the mean overall sentence
memory score and the mean score on 3-clause sentences are reported in the
Appendix. For the tests discussed below, there is no difference in results for the
3-clause score vs. the overall score.
The composite Complex Span score was formed by first computing a z
score for each subject on Reading Span, Math Span, and Category Span, then
computing the linear combination of the z scores on the three tests. The linear
combination of z scores was used so that each test contributed equally to the
Complex Span score.
Results
Figure 1 plots sentence memory as a function of number of clauses for the
three sentence types. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. The means,
standard deviations, and ranges are shown in Table 2. Large individual
differences were observed, especially for 3-clause sentences. Significant main
effects were found for number of clauses, F(3, 87) = 322.99, 2 < .001, and
sentence type, F(2,58) = 4.34, 1 < .02; the interaction was also significant,
F(6,174) = 2.62, p < .03.
Table 2. Percent Correct for Each Sentence Type and Length: Means,
(Standard Deviations), and Ranges
2 Clauses 3 Clauses 4 Clauses 5 Clauses
Relative Clause 97 64 36 24
(RC) (5) (17) (17) (13)
82-100 31-94 0-79 3-53
Sentential 93 64 26 27
Complement (12) (26) (19) (12)
(SC) 67- 100 17- 100 0- 67 8- 50
Double Object 92 56 32 23
(DO) (13) (24) (12) (9)
56-100 13-100 8-58 6-41
The primary question of interest was whether accuracy on DO sentences,
in which each clause contained one additional discourse referent, would be
significantly worse than accuracy on the other two types. Figure 2 shows that
error bars overlapped at all sentence lengths, suggesting that there was no
reliable difference between sentence types. Planned comparisons showed
marginally significant differences between the sentence types at the 2-clause
(F(2,58) = 2.72, p < .07) and 3-clause (F(2,58) = 2.8, 1 < .07) lengths, but no
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Figure 1. Accuracy of sentence memory as a function of sentence type and number of clauses
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consistent finding of significantly impaired performance on DO sentences relative
to the other sentence types. Instead, accuracy declined as a function of the
number of clauses for all three sentence types. The difference between 4- and
5-clause sentences was significant overall, F(1,29) = 10.5, p < .003. This
difference reflects the fact that accuracy on RC and DO sentences continued to
decline as sentence length increased (RC: 4-clause, 36%; 5-clause, 24%; DO:
4-clause, 32%; 5-clause, 23%) while accuracy on SC sentences did not (4-
clause, 26%; 5-clause, 27%).
A table showing zero-order correlations between all working memory
measures, the composite Complex Span score, the overall sentence memory
score, and the mean sentence memory score for 3-clause sentences is included
in the Appendix. I will discuss a subset of those scores here. Table 3 shows
correlations among the working memory measures (Backward Digit Span, N-
back, and Complex Span) and the STS measure (Word Span). All correlations
were significant except the correlation between N-back and Word Span, and N-
back and Complex Span.
Table 3. Correlations among Working Memory and Short-Term Storage
Measures
Back Digit Span N-back Complex Span
Word Span .44* .21 .57**
Back Digit Span .43* .46*
N-back -.09
* 2<.05
* < .01
Table 4 shows correlations between working memory and STS and
sentence memory capacity. All correlations were significant. In order to
determine the relative contribution of these variables to explaining individual
differences in working memory capacity, I entered the four variables into a
multiple regression equation (Table 5): The linear combination of Backward Digit
Span, Word Span, N-back and Complex Span significantly predicted sentence
memory (F(4,21) = 5.57, p < .003), explaining 51% of the variance in the
sentence memory score. However, the only two predictors that contributed to the
relation were N-back, which uniquely accounted for 16% of the variance, and
Complex Span, which accounted for an additional 12%. In spite of correlating
significantly with sentence memory, Backward Digit Span and Word Span did not
account for any additional unique variance. When N-back and Complex Span
were entered alone as predictors, the model still accounted for 51% of the
variance in sentence memory, and both predictors explained 28% of the unique
variance in sentence memory capacity (Table 6).
Table 4. Correlations Between Short-Term Store and Working Memory
Measures and Sentence Memory Capacity
STS / WM Test Correlation with Sentence Memory
Word Span .44*
Back Digit Span .50**
N-back 
.48**
Complex Span .48**
* <. 0 5
** p < .01
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Table 5. Multiple Regression of Working Memory and STS Variables:
Percentage of Variance in Sentence Memory and Significant p Values
R2 for model = .51
STS / WM Test % Variance* p
N-back 16 .01
Complex Span 12 .03
Word Span <1 n.s.
bDS <1 n.s.
*Squared semi-partial correlations
Table 6. Multiple Regression of N-back and Complex Span: Percentage of
Variance in Sentence Memory and Significant p Values
R2 for model = .51
STS / WM Test % Variance* p
N-back 28 .001
Complex Span 28 .001
*Squared semi-partial correlations
In order to determine whether the different components of working
memory each contribute to sentence memory, I entered the two tests
hypothesized to measure the components independently: N-back as a measure
of the CE, and Word Span as a measure of the STS (Table 7): The linear
combination of N-back and Word Span significantly predicted sentence memory
(F(2,23) = 6.29, p < .007), explaining 35% of the variance in the sentence
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memory score. Each predictor uniquely accounted for a significant portion of the
variance: N-back for 16% and Word Span for 12%.
Table 7. Multiple Regression of Individual Components of Working Memory:
Percentage of Variance in Sentence Memory and Significant p Values
R2 for model = .35
Component Test % Variance* p
N-back (CE) 16 .03
Word Span (STS) 12 .05
*Squared semi-partial correlations
Discussion
The first question I addressed was the unit of sentence memory. I tested
two alternative hypotheses: (a) that sentence memory would be a function of the
number of clauses and (b) that sentence memory would be a function of the
number of discourse referents. For interpretive processing, discourse referents
appear to be the units of processing (Gibson, 1998); however, the current results
show that for sentence memory (one form of post-interpretive processing) the
clause, rather than the discourse referent, is the unit of memory. This finding not
only confirms, in a rigorous way, the commonly held belief in that the unit of
sentence memory is the clause, but also is relevant to the debate, discussed in
Caplan & Waters (1998), about whether interpretive and post-interpretive
processing use the same memory resources. The fact that the two types of
processing use different units suggests that Caplan and Water's suggestion, that
the two types of processing are distinct, is correct.
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The second question concerned the relation between sentence memory
capacity and working memory, and whether the two hypothesized components of
verbal working memory (the STS and the CE) both contribute to sentence
memory capacity. I found that over half the variance in sentence memory
capacity could be explained by a combination of two working memory tests, the
N-back, which I have hypothesized measures one aspect of CE function, and the
Complex Span measure, a composite of three tests modeled on Daneman &
Carpenter's (1980) original Reading Span measure. Because Complex Span is
a combination of three tests with similar task demands (simultaneously storing
and processing information and switching attention between the two subtasks)
but with different processing requirements (reading sentences, performing
addition problems, categorizing words), the predictive power of Complex Span
reflects the relation between sentence memory and whatever aspect of working
memory that Complex Span measures. This finding contradicts MacDonald &
Christiansen's (1998) claim that correlations between linguistic working memory
measures and sentence comprehension measures are due to the fact that both
are sensitive to subject's reading ability.
These results are also relevant to MacDonald & Christiansen's (1998)
attempt to abolish the working memory construct. Their alternative skill-via-
experience account (better readers are better at both linguistic working memory
and sentence comprehension tasks) does not account for the correlations
observed in this study. N-back, Math Span, and Category Span, tests that did
not involve reading sentences, were correlated with sentence memory. In fact,
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the zero-order correlations (shown in the Appendix) between Math Span and
Category Span and sentence memory were higher than between Reading Span
and sentence memory. MacDonald & Christiansen's only possible explanation
for such correlations is that all these tests are sensitive to "the accuracy of
phonological representations," which they claim is a biological factor underlying
individual differences (along with reading skill, an experiential factor). In fact,
their explanation for individual differences on Reading Span and Listening Span
is that these tests reflect differences in phonological processing ability, rather
than differences in working memory. However, once again this account shifts the
burden of explaining individual differences from the working memory construct to
the idea that "maintaining a set of unrelated words requires substantial activation
of phonological representations" (p. 14), as does sentence comprehension.
They claim that Reading Span measures "the ability to comprehend sentences in
the face of competing phonological activation from a series of words that are
being prepared for articulation, and to maintain phonological activation for the
words in the face of competing demands from sentence processing" (p. 15).
Maintaining phonological activation of words is another way of describing the
storage functions of working memory. Thus, MacDonald and Christiansen have
not, in fact, presented an adequate alternative to the idea of variance in working
memory capacity as the source of individual differences in understanding
language.
Although the dominant view of working memory and sentence
comprehension does not provide a complete and satisfying account for individual
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differences observed on working memory tests, or the relation between scores
on working memory tests and language processing, at this time there does not
appear to be a viable alternative view. The current finding, that there is a
correlation between working memory tests and sentence memory, suggests that
they are both calling on resources that are central, in that the same resources
are used for a variety of complex cognitive tasks. Much more research will be
required to (a) provide better definitions of working memory, especially those
functions subserved by the CE in Baddeley's (1986) model, and (b) determine
what factors (cognitive or neurological) account for the individual differences
observed on different working memory and sentence memory tests.
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Appendix
Zero-Order Correlations for All Tests Used in Chapter 3
fDS WS bDS N-back Comp Read Math Cat Count SentMem SentMem
Span Span Span Span Span (all) (3 Cl)
0.29 0.71***
0.29
0.71*** 0.44*
0.20 0.21 0.43*
0.40* 0.57**
0.25 0.52**
0.2 0.40* 0.25 0.34 0.39* 0.22
0.44* 0.21 0.57** 0.52** 0.28 0.58**
0.43* 0.46* 0.32 0.44* 0.37
0.29 0.31
0.12 0.43* 0.44*
0.19 0.48** 0.50**
-0.09 -0.15 0.1 -0.17 0.24 0.49** 0.48**
0.46* -0.09 0.88*** 0.74*** 0.81***
0.32 -0.15 0.88***
0.34 0.28 0.44* 0.10 0.74***
0.39* 0.58** 0.37 -0.17 0.81***
0.48** 0.65**
0.48**
0.65**
0.28 0.44* 0.48**
0.23
0.33 0.28
0.33
0.31 0.33
0.37 0.49**
0.17 0.39*
0.22 0.12 0.19 0.24 0.28 0.23 0.28 0.17
0.36
0.310.16
0.29 0.43* 0.48**
0.31 0.44* 0.50**
0.49** 0.44*
0.48** 0.48**
0.31 0.37 0.39* 0.16
0.33 0.49** 0.36 0.31 0.92***
* p <.05
** p <.01
*** p <.001
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FDS
WS
BDS
N-back
Comp
Span
Read
Span
Math
Span
Cat
Span
Count
Span
SentMem
(all)
SentMem
(3 Cl)
0.92***
Chapter 4
Conclusions
If little else, the brain is an educational toy. While it may be a
frustrating plaything - one whose finer points recede just when you
think you are mastering them - it is nonetheless perpetually
fascinating, frequently surprising, occasionally rewarding, and it
comes already assembled; you don't have to put it together on
Christmas morning.
-Tom Robbins, Even Cowgirls Get the Blues
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I. Modeling and Measuring Working Memory
The experiment reported in Chapter 2 showed that, although the all of the
tests compared fit the definition of working memory, scores on different tests
were not correlated, and were sensitive to different underlying factors. The fact
that different "working memory" tests were uncorrelated suggests that the
operational definition of working memory is inadequate: The definition is
imprecise enough to include unrelated tests with different task demands. Thus,
one prerequisite for progress in understanding working memory is a more
precise, restrictive definition of the function. An improved definition of working
memory would have to directly address the grab-bag, homuncular nature of the
CE component. Many executive functions contribute to working memory:
planning; managing goals, coordinating component processes; monitoring
automatic processes; controlling effortful processes; marshaling, allocating, and
switching attention; and inhibiting prepotent responses (Baddeley, 1996; Lehto,
1996; Petrides, 1994, 1995b). These functions, however, are necessary for the
performance of most complex cognitive tasks, not just tasks requiring the on-line
maintenance and manipulation of information. One suggestion for making the
definition of working memory more specific, and thus more useful, is to restrict it
to the on-line maintenance and manipulation of currently relevant stimuli, and to
remove those non-mnemonic functions from under the working memory
umbrella. Baddeley (1996) has suggested a similar approach: If researchers are
able to separate and understand subcomponents of executive control, the idea of
a "central executive" will become redundant, and may be retired in favor of more
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precise descriptions of the functions needed to perform different aspect of
cognition, such as goal-directed behavior and understanding language. A
construct like "working memory" or "the central executive" is only useful insofar
as it brings us closer to reaching the goal of understanding and explaining
cognitive functions and how they are represented in and performed by the brain.
A second conclusion that can be drawn from these results concerns the
most useful approach to take in trying to map cognitive functions onto the brain.
Rather than using complex tests that are sensitive to multiple components of a
function like working memory, it is best to create relatively simple measures of
single components. Scores on complex, multicomponent tests are difficult to
interpret, because individual differences in normal subjects, and impaired
performance in lesioned subjects, could arise due to difficulty on any one of the
test components.
II. Assessing cognitive models of working memory
The experiments described in this thesis are relevant to the debate about
how best to model working memory. While SR models claim that all working
memory functions rely on the same pool of resources, MC models view working
memory as a set of interacting components. The fact that scores on different
tests are not correlated and are sensitive to different hypothesized components
(i.e., short-term store, CE) lends support to this view. In addition, the
multicomponent nature of CE functions is supported by results of selective lesion
studies in monkeys (Petrides, 1994; 1995) and imaging studies in humans
(Petrides, 1993a, 1993b) that distinguish between brain regions used for
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monitoring within working memory (dorsolateral frontal cortex), conditional
learning (posterior dorsal prefrontal cortex), and strategic encoding and retrieval
from long-term memory (ventral prefrontal cortex).
Another distinction between SR and MC models is their explanation for
individual differences in normal subjects. Individual differences have been
observed in the performance of working memory tests, and in the effects of aging
and neurological disease on working memory. According to SR models,
individual differences on tests like Daneman and Carpenter's (1980) Reading
Span measure are assumed to reflect differences in the amount of resources
subjects have available to process and store information. But such models do
not provide any reason why normal, healthy subjects should differ in this
capacity. According to MC models, individual differences can occur for a variety
of reasons, and different components of working memory may be affected by
lesions to different brain reasons. In normal subjects, individual differences are
most likely due to differences in the efficiency of executive processes, such as
attention or coordination. Thus, individual differences may be due to differences
in motivation or attention paid to the task, or differences in strategy use, rather
than differences in overall capacity of working memory (Baddeley, 1996).
The experiments in Chapter 3 showed that over half the variance in
sentence memory capacity was due to individual differences in working memory.
N-back and Complex Span, a composite measure sensitive to short-term storage
capacity, together accounted for all the unique variance contributed by the
working memory measures. Word Span, a measure of short-term storage alone,
also accounted for unique variance when used as a predictor in combination with
N-back, suggesting that the CE and the STS make independent contributions to
sentence memory capacity. The results from both chapters, showing that
different working memory tests do not correlate, that more than one factor
underlies the data, and that N-back and tests sensitive to storage capacity
(Complex Span and Word Span, Chapter 3) make independent contributions to
sentence memory capacity, provide support for MC models and contradict the
predictions of SR models.
Single resource models have contributed to attempts to understand the
relation between working memory and language, but have proven less valuable
for forming models based on interdisciplinary data. Such models clearly
originated within cognitive psychological research, without reference to results
from other disciplines. Among researchers studying the neural bases of memory,
it is generally accepted that memory is not a unitary system, but is made up of
interacting components, and that different brain regions contribute to different
components of memory (Moscovitch, 1992). While SR models have stimulated
psycholinguistic investigations of the relation between sentence comprehension
and working memory, such models do not provide an adequate description of
working memory itself. They are unable to account for specific impairments
observed following brain lesions, double dissociations between groups of
subjects with different lesions, and the fact that a distributed network of brain
areas are active during working memory tasks, each of which appears to
contribute to different components of the task (Paulesu et al., 1993; Smith &
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Jonides, 1997). Single resource models are thus inconsistent with
neuropsychological and neuroimaging data, and while they may contribute to
psycholinguistic theory, they do not appear to contribute to the advancement of
our understanding of the relation between the brain and behavior.
III. Future Directions
The goal of generating a complete model of the cognitive and neural
bases of working memory is a daunting one, but it is not entirely out of reach.
The studies conducted and reviewed in this thesis lead to two broad conclusions:
First, a complete model of working memory must be based on the available
evidence from all relevant disciplines, including experimental studies in normal
subjects, neuropsychological investigations of the effects of aging and brain
lesions, and functional neuroimaging experiments. Second, tasks used to
assess working memory should be pretested and validated: It is the researcher's
responsibility to show the connection between the test and the function being
measured. This connection may be demonstrated by presenting an analysis of
the task demands, or by showing that the test is sensitive to the components of
working memory that it is intended to measure. It would be extremely useful if
researchers would perform such validating analyses, and then adopt some
standard versions of tasks that could be used in different laboratories and with
different subject groups. Without such validation and replication, it will be difficult
to develop a model that will be broadly accepted outside of the laboratory in
which it was generated.
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Epilogue
Trials never end, of course. Unhappiness and
misfortune are bound to occur as long as people live,
but there is a feeling now, that was not here before,
and is not just on the surface of things, but penetrates
all the way through: We've won it. It's going to get
better now. You can sort of tell these things.
- Robert Pirsig,
Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance
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